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REVIVING LEGISLATIVE GENERALITY
EVAN C. ZOLDAN*
The Supreme Court does not recognize a constitutional principle
disfavoring special legislation, that is, legislation that singles out
identifiable individuals for benefits or harms that are not applied to the
rest of the population. As a result, both Congress and state legislatures
routinely enact special legislation despite the fact that it has been linked to
a variety of social harms, including corruption and the exacerbation of
social inequality. But the Court’s weak protections against special
legislation, and the resulting harms, are not inevitable. Instead, special
legislation can be limited by what may be called a value of legislative
generality, that is, a principle that legislation should be disfavored as
suspect simply because it singles out identifiable individuals for special
treatment.
In this Article, I argue that the value of legislative generality should be
enforced as an independent constitutional principle. Three pillars—
history, text, and philosophical considerations—support the conclusion
that legislative generality is a principle of constitutional significance.
First, the history of the revolutionary period leading up to the framing of
the Constitution suggests that a key purpose of the Constitution was to
address evils associated with special legislation. Second, the Constitution
contains a number of under-enforced clauses that, when read together and
in context, delineate a norm of legislative generality. Third, an
interpretation of the Constitution that includes a value of legislative
generality fits well with a number of philosophical traditions and leads to
normatively attractive results.
Together, these pillars support the
conclusion that legislative generality is a value with constitutional weight
and suggest that current constitutional doctrine should be modified to give
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effect to this principle. I conclude by calling for heightened judicial
scrutiny over special legislation that offends the value of legislative
generality, including contemporary special legislation in the areas of
immigration, public benefits, and criminal law.
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INTRODUCTION

Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism?
Theory & practice both proclaim it.1
—James Wilson
The principle that rules of conduct ought to apply generally to all of
society’s members, rather than single out individuals for special
treatment, has long been advocated by jurists and philosophers of law.
In his foundational text, The Morality of Law, Lon Fuller argues that
law’s internal morality requires that rules of conduct operate on the
population generally rather than in a patternless set of orders to
individuals.2 Fuller’s conclusion echoes and expands on a centuries-old
tradition; Cicero condemned as “unjust” the Roman legislative practice
of singling out individuals for special treatment.3 The value articulated
by Fuller and Cicero, that law ought to be generally applicable, is
expressed in a number of clauses in the American Constitution: for
example, the Bill of Attainder Clauses prohibit certain types of laws that
single out individuals for punishment without trial; more generally, the
Equal Protection Clause manifests the principle that the law ought to
treat like cases alike. But despite these clauses of the Constitution, and
despite the intuitive and rhetorical power of the principle articulated by
Fuller and Cicero, both Congress and state legislatures routinely pass
laws that single out identifiable individuals for special treatment. This
type of law, called “special legislation,” is often criticized but rarely
invalidated by the courts. A well-known, but far from unique, example
of special legislation is the statute enacted in the wake of the Terri
Schiavo affair.
Terri Schiavo was just twenty-six years old when she fell into the
persistent vegetative state that would last the rest of her life.4 After
eight years of constant medical care, during which time Schiavo never
regained consciousness, her husband moved the court to order the

1. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter FARRAND].
2. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–48 (rev. ed. 1969).
3. MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, On the Laws, in ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON
THE LAWS 105, 173 (James E.G. Zetzel ed., 1999).
4. Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life: Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy,
59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 107 (2004).
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withdrawal of her artificial life support.5 Her parents objected, setting
off a prolonged legal battle to determine whether Schiavo, who had left
no living will, would have wanted to be kept alive artificially “or
whether she would wish to permit a natural death process to take its
course.”6 The court found that Schiavo would have wanted her life
support removed,7 and after several more years of appeals and
remands,8 the hospice facility in which she resided was ordered to
withhold food and water, permitting her to die.9
Schiavo’s tragic situation triggered a media frenzy; it not only
sparked a heated argument over the right to die, but it also rekindled
smoldering national debates over issues as far-reaching and divisive as
abortion, stem cell research, and human cloning.10 In reaction to the
publicity surrounding the order to withhold her life support, Congress
enacted a statute entitled an “Act for the Relief of the Parents of
Theresa Marie Schiavo.”11 “Terri’s Law,” as the statute was called,12
permitted “any parent” of Terri Schiavo to bring suit to redress the
decision to stop providing her with food and medical treatment.13
Although belabored debates often grind the legislative machinery to a
halt, Terri’s Law was rushed through the legislative process. It was
passed by the Senate the same day that it was introduced and was
passed by the House, presented to the President, and signed into law all
on the following day.14 Through Terri’s Law, Congress wiped away the
previous decade of state court litigation over Schiavo’s intentions.15
5. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
6. Id. at 180.
7. Id. at 176–80.
8. Stephen G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law Enacted
by Congress and President Bush, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 151, 151–52 (2006); Noah, supra note 4,
at 114–15.
9. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003, 2005 WL 459634, at *2 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Feb. 25, 2005).
10. E.g., Rafael Lorente, Congress Turning its Focus to Life Issues—Schiavo Efforts
May Be Sign of Future Battles, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 25, 2005, at 11A, available at
2005 WLNR 23621548; Vickie Chachere, Schiavo Case Latest Chapter in Culture War,
CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at A3, available at 2005 WLNR 4972036.
11. Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
12. Calabresi, supra note 8, at 152.
13. Terri’s Law § 2, 119 Stat. at 15.
14. 151 CONG. REC. 5483, 5486–87 (2005) (statement of Sen. Frist); id. at 5447, 5480–81
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); George W. Bush, Statement on Signing Legislation for
the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, 1 PUB. PAPERS 500 (Mar. 21, 2005).
15. Terri’s Law § 2, 119 Stat. at 15.
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No matter where one stands on the social issues raised by the
Schiavo case, there is no doubt that Terri’s Law was a remarkable piece
of legislation. Unlike most laws, which provide generally applicable
rules of conduct for society at large, Terri’s Law made an exception
from the general rules for two readily identifiable individuals, Schiavo’s
parents. Even a cursory look at Terri’s Law reveals why special
legislation is controversial. By creating an exception from the generally
applicable laws for a single individual or small, identifiable group,
special legislation is apt to treat similar cases differently. Because it is
enacted to favor, or to harm, named individuals, special legislation often
arises from legislative passion or prejudice rather than from serious
deliberation. By substituting legislative conclusions for facts normally
found by judges and juries, special legislation encroaches on the judicial
function. For these reasons, among others, special legislation long has
been criticized.
But, despite these and other normative problems, both Congress and
state legislatures routinely enact special legislation. And the Supreme
Court, when reviewing special legislation, subjects it only to minimal
scrutiny. Moreover, although they have wrestled to articulate a legal
basis for requiring meaningful scrutiny for special legislation, scholars so
far have failed to articulate a coherent constitutional theory that
protects against abusive special legislation. The principle introduced in
this Article fills the gaps left by modern jurisprudence and scholarship
by offering a more robust approach to the problem of special legislation.
I explore forgotten parts of our constitutional history, our philosophical
traditions, and nearly forgotten clauses of the Constitution itself. Based
on this inquiry, I conclude that there is a principle that may be used to
restrain special legislation; this principle—which may be called the value
of legislative generality—should be judicially enforced as an
independent constitutional principle.
In Part II, I define special legislation and identify the kinds of special
laws that Congress and state legislatures enact.
In Part III, I examine the response of courts and scholars to special
legislation. The Supreme Court has rejected a constitutional principle
that would restrict special legislation because of its particularized effect.
Similarly, although scholars continue to wrestle with special legislation,
they have failed so far to articulate a robust principle constraining
special legislation that is rooted in the history of the framing of the
Constitution, American philosophical traditions, and the Constitution’s
text.
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In Part IV, I seek to fill the gap left by courts and scholars by
identifying the constitutional bases on which a value of legislative
generality rests. First, the history of the revolutionary period leading up
to the framing of the Constitution suggests that a key purpose of the
Constitution was to address evils associated with special legislation.
Second, the Constitution contains a number of under-enforced clauses
that, when read together and in context, delineate a norm of legislative
generality. Third, an interpretation of the Constitution that includes a
value of legislative generality fits well with a number of philosophical
traditions and leads to normatively attractive results.
In Part V, I turn to the first of the constitutional bases identified in
Part IV—the history leading up to the framing of the Constitution—to
analyze the revolutionary generation’s experiences with special
legislation. This inquiry reveals that the revolutionary generation
enacted special legislation that, like modern special legislation, granted
special privileges and levied special penalties. After years of enacting
special laws, including statutes confiscating property, statutes granting
immunity from civil and criminal prosecution, statutes granting or
withdrawing property rights, and bills of attainder, the revolutionary
generation became acutely aware of special legislation’s negative
consequences. By the time of the framing of the Constitution, and
wearied by a decade of abusive special laws, they repudiated the power
of the legislature to enact special laws.
In Part VI, I argue that the value of legislative generality should be
enforced in a way that gives meaning to the historical experiences of the
revolutionary generation. As a result, the value of legislative generality
should be enforced as a stand-alone constitutional value, much as the
judiciary enforces the constitutional right to privacy or the principle of
separation of powers. Enforcing this value not only makes sense in light
of historical evidence, but also would rationalize an incoherent area of
the law.
This Article focuses on historical evidence supporting the value of
legislative generality. As a result, its conclusions should be of interest to
the many judges16 and scholars17 who recognize historical experience as

16. E.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014) (“[W]e put significant
weight upon historical practice.” (emphasis removed)).
17. E.g., Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment,
81 KY. L.J. 323, 326 (1992–1993); Harlan Grant Cohen, “Undead” Wartime Cases: Stare
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one of the traditional methods used to find meaning in constitutional
text. This includes both originalists as well as non-originalists who, like
me, consider history probative, but not dispositive, of constitutional
meaning.
But even for those courts and scholars who have little interest in
historical analysis, even as one method of constitutional interpretation,
the value of legislative generality possesses other virtues. For example,
measured by many standards of justice, laws that single out individuals
for special treatment are suspect. They tend to treat like cases
differently, lead to conflicts of interest—and even corruption—and
inure to the benefit of the well-connected. Judicial recognition of a
value of legislative generality would allow courts to invalidate many of
the most abusive modern special laws. In sum, although this Article is
limited, due to space constraints, to the historical underpinnings of the
value of legislative generality, non-historically contingent arguments are
central to a robust articulation of this value. These arguments, sketched
in Part IV, will be addressed more fully in later work.
II. THE PHENOMENON OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION
Special legislation—that is, legislation that singles out an individual
or small, known group for special treatment—is an accepted fact of
modern legislative practice. Special laws are enacted both by Congress
and state legislatures. They are enacted in a variety of substantive legal
areas, including tax, immigration, criminal law, and public benefits.
They are enacted both as private laws and public laws; they are used
both to confer benefits and levy detriments. In order to facilitate
analysis of the causes and consequences of the prevalence of special
legislation, this Part will define and categorize the most common types
of special laws.
A. Special Legislation Defined
“Special legislation” is legislation that singles out an individual
natural person or corporation, or a small number of identifiable
individuals, for treatment that is not applicable to the general
population.18 Although special legislation can include legislation either
Decisis and the Lessons of History, 84 TUL. L. REV. 957 (2010); Melissa L. Saunders, Equal
Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 252–53 (1997).
18. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 315 (2007) (“‘[S]pecial’ or ‘partial’ legislation” includes legislation that “pick[s] out a
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at the state or federal level, it excludes government action by the
executive and judicial branches.
For example, a government
prosecutor’s decision to prosecute an accused individual is “special” in
the sense that it singles out one person for particularized treatment.
However, this is not special legislation because it is a decision by the
executive rather than the legislature. Similarly, decisions of executive
agencies, like a state zoning board’s decision to grant a variance or the
Army’s decision to award a government contract, are not legislation
and, therefore, do not fall within the scope of this article. Judicial
action, likewise, is not legislation; therefore, a court order awarding a
money judgment is not contemplated by this Article.19
There is no doubt that constitutional constraints on government
action taken by the executive and judicial branches are important issues;
nevertheless, this Article focuses on special legislation alone for three
reasons. First, as described in Part V, Americans in the years leading up
to the framing of the Constitution expressed particular concern with
special legislation as opposed to particularized action by the judiciary or
executive branches. Second, there is an abundance of literature
examining issues related to particularized government action in the
context of executive and judicial action. In particular, much has been
written about restrictions imposed by the Equal Protection and Due

group for special benefits or special burdens.”); Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local,
Private, and Special Legislation in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 271, 271 (2004) (special legislation includes both “local and private legislation” and is
distinguished from “[g]eneral legislation”); Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports
Teams—A Constitutional Disgrace: The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State
Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L.
REV. 393, 399 (1999) (defining special legislation as “laws . . . made applicable to a particular
person, group or thing within a specified class, which are not applicable to the entire class”);
Comment, The Constitutionality of Private Acts of Congress, 49 YALE L.J. 712, 712 n.1 (1940)
(special legislation includes legislation applying to “only one or a few determinable
individuals”).
19. Moreover, “special legislation” does not include all legislation that makes
distinctions based on membership in a class; it does not include industry-specific legislation,
like legislation affecting the banking industry, which has thousands of members. It also
excludes legislation that levies detriments on a group, for example, because of an immutable
characteristic, like race or religion. Although the issue of class legislation is surely an
important one, it is one that has been well-articulated by others and therefore will not be
repeated here. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Pluralist Theory of the Equal Protection
Clause, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1239, 1239, 1246–47 (2009); Saunders, supra note 17, at 254,
289–90; see also Balkin, supra note 18, at 315–16; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without
Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L REV. 481, 528–30 (2004); V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost
History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 959–65, 995–96 (2009).
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Process Clauses;20 by contrast, there is a dearth of scholarship addressing
particularized legislative action. Third, as will be described more fully in
future work, a value of legislative generality, as opposed to a value of
generality in the executive and judicial branches, makes the most sense
given the different roles of the three branches of government.21 For
these reasons, the scope of this Article is limited to special legislation.
B. Identifying and Classifying Special Legislation
It can be challenging to identify special legislation because of the
wide variety of ways in which it is enacted. Although some special laws
name a single individual in the law’s title,22 other laws name a number of
individuals.23 Still others refrain from naming any individuals but, by
intent or operation, apply only to a small number of identifiable
individuals.24 Moreover, special laws may provide either benefits or
detriments and may be enacted either as criminal or civil statutes. As
described below, Congress and state legislatures routinely enact laws
denominated as public or private, that grant special benefits or special
detriments, and that may be construed as either criminal or civil laws.
No matter which of these attributes a statute possesses, it properly may
be considered “special” legislation if it singles out an individual person,
or small, identifiable group, for treatment not experienced by the
general population.25
1. Both Public and Private Laws Can Be Special Legislation.
Congress and state legislatures occasionally enact “private laws,”
which, as opposed to more common “public laws,” are denominated as
being “for the benefit” or “relief” of a particular named party.26 In

20. See infra text accompanying notes 112–16.
21. See FULLER, supra note 2, at 170–76.
22. E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1 (2012).
23. E.g., Priv. L. No. 108-4, 118 Stat. 4028 (2004).
24. E.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13
(1983) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247–48 & n.20 (1978))
(state statute perhaps aimed at “one particular employer planning to terminate its pension
plan”); Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the
Elizabeth Morgan Act, Pub. L. No. 104-205, § 350, 110 Stat. 2951, 2979 (1996), “targeted” a
single individual despite its purported generality).
25. See supra note 18.
26. E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1; see also Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on
Special Laws, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719, 723 (2012).
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recent years, Congress has enacted private legislation exempting named
individuals from the general requirements of the immigration and
naturalization laws,27 granting money payments to former government
employees,28 and granting an individual the right to live on public
lands.29 However, because of state restrictions on private laws,30 highprofile scandals associated with private legislation,31 and restrictions
imposed on the introduction of private bills in the United States House
of Representatives,32 their numbers have declined in recent years.33
Nevertheless, Congress still enacts private bills in practically every
legislative session.34
Somewhat harder to identify,35 but far more common, are public
laws so limited in scope that, like private laws, they apply only to an
individual or small, identifiable group.36 A well-known example is the
legislation, noted above, that granted a private remedy to the parents of
Terri Schiavo.37 Although styled as a public law, Terri’s Law applied by
its terms only to “[a]ny parent of Theresa Marie Schiavo”; and in
section 7 of the Act, entitled “No Precedent for Future Legislation,” the
law provided that “[n]othing in this Act shall constitute a precedent with
respect to future legislation, including the provision of private relief
27. E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1; see MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
PRIVATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION 2 (2007).
28. Priv. L. No. 107-4, 116 Stat. 3122 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-3, 116 Stat. 3121 (2002).
29. Priv. L. No. 109-1, 120 Stat. 3705 (2006).
30. Ireland, supra note 18, at 299 (“By the early twentieth century most states had by
constitutional revision specifically prohibited a variety of special legislation.”); see also
Comment, Special Legislation Discriminating Against Specified Individuals and Groups, 51
YALE L.J. 1358, 1358 (1942) (“All but four of the state constitutions contain express
restrictions against the enactment of special legislation.”). However, state courts have tended
to construe state constitutional bans on special legislation narrowly, permitting state
legislatures to enact special laws with a great deal of discretion despite these restrictions. See,
e.g., Rubin, supra note 18, at 398 n.22.
31. A “series of corruption scandals such as Abscam, involving payoffs for the
sponsorship of private immigration laws, culminated in the expulsion of one Member of the
House of Representatives and led to a decline in private immigration laws, which were
perceived as tainted in general by the scandals.” LEE, supra note 27, at 9.
32. Id. at 4, 7–8.
33. Id. at 9.
34. E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1 (2012); Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010).
35. Indeed, public laws sometimes are used in place of private bills because they are
harder to identify and therefore draw less scrutiny. See LEE, supra note 27, at 30.
36. E.g., Terri’s Law, Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2, 119 Stat. 15, 15–16 (2005); see also
Comment, supra note 18, at 712 n.1.
37. Terri’s Law §§ 2–3, 119 Stat. at 15.

636

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:625

bills.”38 Despite the obviously special nature of Terri’s Law, it was
enacted as a public law.39
Similarly, Congress and state legislatures routinely enact public laws
that single out an individual natural person,40 corporation,41 or small,
identifiable group42 for special treatment without explicitly naming these
individuals in the statute. For example, in the guise of a narrowly drawn
public law, the State of Minnesota provided a very specific definition of
companies that would be penalized for terminating their pension plans.43
The Supreme Court held that this law, although facially general in
application, in fact “was aimed at specific employers” or perhaps even
“one particular employer planning to terminate its pension plan.”44
Similarly, in the Elizabeth Morgan Act, Congress exempted a mother
and daughter from the ongoing jurisdiction of a court in a custody
dispute.45 Although the law was drafted to be facially neutral, the court
held that it too was designed to reach only a particular pending case.46
Like Terri’s Law, these laws made exceptions for particular, identifiable
individuals or small, known groups from the generally applicable laws
that otherwise would have governed their disputes. Because they single
out a known set of individuals, these narrowly tailored public laws, just
like private laws that overtly grant special treatment to named
individuals,47 properly can be called “special legislation.”48

38. Id. §§ 2, 7, 119 Stat. at 15–16.
39. Terri’s Law, 119 Stat. at 15–16.
40. E.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 158 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring); Foretich
v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Elizabeth Morgan Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-205, § 350, 110 Stat. 2951, 2979 (1996)).
41. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13 (1983)
(citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247–48 & n.20 (1978)).
42. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591
(1983) (challenged state tax law “targets a small group of newspapers”).
43. Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 247–48 & n.20.
44. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412 n.13 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at
247–48 & n.20).
45. Elizabeth Morgan Act § 350, 110 Stat. at 2979.
46. Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
47. E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1 (2012); Priv. L. No. 109-1, 120 Stat. 3705 (2006); Priv. L. No.
107-4, 116 Stat. 3122 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-3, 116 Stat. 3121 (2002).
48. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 18, at 315; Ireland, supra note 18, at 271; Rubin, supra
note 18, at 399; Comment, supra note 18, at 712 n.1.
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2. Categories of Special Legislation
Special laws can touch on a wide variety of substantive subject
matters, including public spending, immigration, and taxation, to name a
few. No matter the substantive subject matter of the law, special
legislation can provide special benefits or special detriments and can be
considered civil or criminal in nature. As a result, special laws of all
types can be placed into one of four conceptual categories: special
benefit civil legislation, special detriment civil legislation, special benefit
criminal legislation, and special detriment criminal legislation.
Legislation falling into each of these categories has been enacted by
Congress and state legislatures since the Constitution’s ratification and,
in many cases, was enacted by the states prior to the ratification of the
Constitution. As will be described more fully in Part V, special
legislation was particularly rampant during the period between
independence from Britain and the framing of the Constitution.
a. Special Benefit Civil Legislation
The most common category of special legislation today is special
benefit civil legislation. State legislatures and Congress routinely
provide special benefits by statute, including transferring public funds to
particular natural persons49 or corporations,50 providing preferential tax
treatment to specific corporations,51 granting exemptions from generally
applicable statutes and regulations,52 and extending statutes of
limitations for particular cases.53 Perhaps the most widespread example

49. E.g., Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558,
565 (2013); Priv. L. No. 108-5, 118 Stat. 4030 (2004); Priv. L. No. 107-2, 116 Stat. 3119 (2002);
Priv. L. No. 103-5, 108 Stat. 5064 (1994); Priv. L. No. 103-3, 108 Stat. 5062 (1994).
50. Rubin, supra note 18, at 398 n.22; see also Kathryn Wakefield, Comment, Just-inTime Legislation: Do Corporation-Specific Statutes Violate State Constitutional Prohibitions
on Special Legislation?, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 843, 853 (2000).
51. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 80 (1991).
52. Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010);
Priv. L. No. 108-6, 118 Stat. 4032 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-4, 118 Stat. 4028 (2004); Priv. L. No.
108-3, 118 Stat. 4026 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-1, 118 Stat. 4023 (2004); Priv. L. No. 107-5, 116
Stat. 3123 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-1, 115 Stat. 2471 (2001) (all granting exemptions from the
Immigration and Nationality Act and reducing the total number of visas otherwise available);
see also Priv. L. No. 105-4, 111 Stat. 2699 (1997) (granting citizenship retroactively to permit
beneficiary to be eligible for benefits only available to citizens).
53. E.g., Merly v. State, 558 A.2d 977, 984–85 (Conn. 1989); Osborn v. Rhode Island,
No. NC84-0101, 1992 WL 813531, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1992).
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of this type of special law is private immigration legislation.54 There
have been thousands of private immigration bills enacted;55 these special
laws typically name a single individual56 or small group57 and provide
that, notwithstanding generally applicable legal requirements, the
named individuals are granted legal permanent resident status.58
Another common type of special benefit legislation is the payment of
public funds to named individuals; in two recent examples of special
transfers of public wealth, Congress provided for gratuitous payments of
$193,40059 and $174,000,60 respectively, to the widows of two deceased
Senators.
b. Special Detriment Civil Legislation
Special detriment civil legislation, widespread throughout the
revolutionary period,61 is common today as well. The paradigmatic
example of special detriment civil legislation is a legislative taking.62 In
one recent, well-publicized example of a legislative taking, Congress
enacted a statute taking property from the City of San Diego, setting
aside a California state court ruling that enjoined the transfer under
state law.63 Outside of the takings arena, Congress and state legislatures
enact laws that levy special detriments on particular corporations64 or
abrogate specific contracts.65

54. E.g., 124 Stat. at 4525; 124 Stat. at 4523.
55. LEE, supra note 27, at 2.
56. E.g., 115 Stat. at 2471.
57. E.g., 118 Stat. at 4028.
58. E.g., 124 Stat. at 4525; 124 Stat. at 4523.
59. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6,
§ 1601, 127 Stat. 198, 426 (2013).
60. Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565
(2013).
61. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 302 (enlarged ed. 1992); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 71 (1999); W.P. Trent, The Case of Josiah Philips, 1 AM. HIST. REV. 444, 454 (1896).
62. E.g., Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-272, § 2,
120 Stat. 770, 770–72 (2006); Paulson v. City of San Diego, 475 F.3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir.
2007); see also 16 U.S.C. § 79c(b)(1) (2012).
63. § 2, 120 Stat. at 770–72.
64. E.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
591 (1983) (challenged state tax law “targets a small group of newspapers”); Energy Reserves
Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13 (1983) (citing Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247–48 & n.20 (1978)).
65. E.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1977).
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c. Special Detriment Criminal Legislation
The paradigm of special detriment legislation in the criminal context
is the bill of attainder.66 Although the newly independent states enacted
thousands of bills of attainder during the revolutionary era,67 perhaps
the most famous was the Virginia Assembly’s bill declaring Josiah
Philips and his gang guilty of high treason.68 When the authorities were
unable to apprehend Philips, whom they believed to be the leader of a
“disorderly mob,”69 the Virginia Assembly attainted Philips in order to
avoid “the delays which would attend” proceeding “according to the
usual forms and procedures of the courts of law.”70
Although most special detriment criminal legislation effectively has
been barred by the Constitution’s prohibition on bills of attainder,
modern legislatures still occasionally impose special criminal detriments.
For example, responding to Cold War anti-Communist fervor, Congress
enacted a statute specifically directed at deporting one particular
person, Harry Bridges, because of his affiliation with the Communist
Party.71

66. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787, at 93 (1956); LEVY, supra note 61, at 68; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 279 (1969); see also Comment, The Bounds of
Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J.
330, 330–31 (1962).
67. CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 93; LEVY, supra note 61, at 70–71; WOOD, supra note 66,
at 279; Trent, supra note 61, at 454; see Comment, supra note 66, at 331.
68. An Act to Attaint Josiah Phillips and Others, Unless They Render Themselves to
Justice Within a Certain Time, ch. 12 (1778), in 9 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 463, 463–64 (William Waller Hening ed., Richmond, J.
& G. Cochran 1821) [hereinafter STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA]. Like many bills of
attainder enacted in England, Philips’s attainder was conditional; that is, he was attainted of
treason only if he refused to turn himself in to the authorities. See id.; LEVY, supra note 61,
at 72.
69. Trent, supra note 61, at 445 (quoting THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION OF
DELEGATES FOR THE COUNTIES AND CORPORATIONS IN THE COLONY OF VIRGINIA 9
(rprt. 1816) (1775)).
70. An Act to Attaint Josiah Phillips and Others, Unless They Render Themselves to
Justice Within a Certain Time, ch. 12, in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 68,
at 463–64. Philips was captured alive and, despite the outstanding bill of attainder, was tried
and executed for robbery rather than for treason. Why Philips was tried for robbery rather
than executed for treason is subject to historical debate. LEVY, supra note 61, at 72–74;
Trent, supra note 61, at 448.
71. H.R. 9766, 76th CONG. (3d Sess. 1940); Maurice A. Roberts, The Harry Bridges
Cases, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1385, 1387 (1999). The deportation of Harry Bridges is
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d. Special Benefit Criminal Legislation
Also less common today, special benefit criminal legislation has also
been enacted in the United States since the revolutionary era.72 During
the war for independence, the Vermont Legislature pardoned, by name,
the instigators of a riot because of their previous service in the
Continental Army.73 In a more recent example, the State of California
granted immunity from criminal prosecution to specific government
officials who had been determined by a state court to have violated the
law.74
III. JUDICIAL AND SCHOLARLY RESPONSE TO SPECIAL LEGISLATION
A value of legislative generality—that is, a principle that there is
something suspect about legislation that singles out known individuals
for special treatment—is not enforced as an independent constitutional
value. Courts, while subjecting special laws to judicial scrutiny in
individual cases, have failed to conceptualize special legislation as a
category of law deserving coherent and meaningful restriction due to its
lack of generality. Moreover, scholarship addressing special legislation
has not offered a robust theory that would justify restraining special
legislation because of its particularized effect. As a result, the value of
legislative generality remains largely unenforced, and special legislation
remains an accepted part of the legislative process.
A. The Supreme Court Does Not Effectively or
Coherently Restrain Special Legislation.
The Supreme Court neither articulates a principle that coherently
addresses special legislation nor meaningfully restricts the power of the
legislature to enact special legislation. The Court expressly has rejected
a principle that would treat legislative specification as constitutionally
analogous to the Parliamentary banishments enacted in England. See CHAFEE, supra note
66, at 117.
72. E.g., ADDRESS OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS (Feb. 14, 1786) [hereinafter
VERMONT REPORT], in RECORDS OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS OF THE STATE OF
VERMONT 58, 70 (Paul S. Gillies & D. Gregory Sanford eds., 1991).
73. Id.
74. Act of Feb. 20, 2009, ch.9, § 5, 2009 Cal. Stat. 3418, 3419 (“Notwithstanding any
other law, no governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, shall
incur any liability or be subject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits
provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective
date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not authorized under law.”).
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suspect. Moreover, when the Court has reviewed individual special
laws, it has announced a variety of overlapping but inconsistent tests,
rendering a coherent principle concerning special legislation impossible
within the confines of current doctrine.
1. The Court Does Not Treat Special Legislation as Suspect Because of
Its Particularized Effect.
The Supreme Court’s modern cases do not treat special legislation as
constitutionally defective because of its lack of generality. In Plaut,75 a
group of investors brought suit against an investment company for
securities fraud; the Court held that the fraud suit was brought after the
applicable statute of limitations, and the suits were dismissed.76 In
response, Congress retroactively abrogated this decision, providing that
the dismissed suits would be treated as if timely filed. In Plaut, the
Court invalidated the statute but definitively rejected the argument that
the statute was defective because it targeted a specific class of cases or a
particular defendant.77
The Court held that whether Congress singled out a group of
lawsuits for special treatment did not affect the law’s validity. Viewing
the issue as one of separation of powers, the Court noted that neither
favoritism nor particularized action on the part of the legislature
rendered the statute constitutionally infirm.78 The Court dismissed the
notion that “there is something wrong with particularized legislative
action,” noting that, although “legislatures usually act through laws of
general applicability, that is by no means their only legitimate mode of
action.”79 Even laws that single out an individual natural person or
corporation, the Court held, “are not on that account invalid.”80 The
Court noted that Congress long has enacted private bills and reaffirmed
that Congress is permitted to legislate even for “a legitimate class of
one.”81 The Court specifically rejected Justice Breyer’s concurrence, in
which he expressed some concern that a law that retroactively reopens
75. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 214–15 (1995).
76. Id. at 213–14 (citing Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350 (1991)).
77. Id. at 238–39.
78. Id. at 228, 239.
79. Id. at 239 n.9.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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previously dismissed but readily identifiable lawsuits could be used to
oppress individual litigants.82
Plaut’s sanction of particularized legislative action, and in particular
its reiteration that Congress possesses the power to legislate for a
“legitimate class of one,” typifies the modern rule that the legislature
may, without offending the Constitution, enact a law that singles out a
named individual so long as the focus of the enactment can be “fairly
and rationally understood.”83 In Nixon, the Court considered a federal
statute ordering the Administrator of General Services to take
possession of all tape recordings made by President Nixon, who was
specifically named in the statute.84 The Court recognized that the
statute, in addition to singling out Nixon for special treatment, was
“predominantly precipitated by a resolve to undo” a particular contract
between the former President and the Administrator of General
Services that described the scope of materials that would be donated to
the public for keeping.85 Nevertheless, the Court held that this special
law was constitutional because the law could be “rationally
understood”86 as an “act of nonpunitive legislative policymaking.”87
Similarly, the Court has upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, although it recognized that the provision
“granted a special benefit to a single litigant in a pending” case.88
Although the Court has suggested that it will entertain a challenge to
a statute brought by a plaintiff who has been singled out as a “class of
one,” protection under this theory is limited. A plaintiff may invoke a
class of one theory under the Equal Protection Clause only when she is
“intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated.”89
82. Compare id. at 238, with id. at 242–43 (Breyer, J., concurring).
83. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472–73.
84. Id. at 433–34.
85. Id. at 431, 479.
86. Id. at 472.
87. Id. at 477.
88. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 266 & n.22 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the law at issue in Landgraf “was intended to exempt a single
disparate impact lawsuit against” a particular company (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 258 (1994))). Following the lead of the Supreme Court, state courts have
declined to offer meaningful protection against special legislation. See Long, supra note 26, at
742–43. Although many states have specific constitutional prohibitions in place designed to
combat special legislation, state courts generally apply very lenient standards, akin to rational
basis, when reviewing special laws. Id. at 732, 759.
89. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
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Moreover, a class of one challenge is limited to “intentional and
arbitrary” discrimination when there is “no rational basis” for the
differential treatment.90 The Court has further limited the class of one
theory to circumstances in which there is a “clear standard against which
departures . . . could be readily assessed,” thus insulating state action
from class of one equal protection review when the action is otherwise
within the discretion of the state actor.91
2. The Court Has Failed to Articulate a Coherent Method of
Analyzing Special Legislation.
Consistent with its statements in Plaut and Nixon that reject the
notion that there is something wrong with particularized legislative
action, the Court’s decisions reviewing special legislation do not
describe a coherent principle indicating when special laws will run afoul
of the Constitution. Instead, when the Court examines special laws, it
considers them under a variety of constitutional provisions, including
the Equal Protection Clause,92 the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto
Clauses,93 the Spending Clause,94 the Takings Clause,95 the Contract
Clause,96 and the Klein anti-rule of decision principle.97 When deciding

90. Id. (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)).
91. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric. 553 U.S. 591, 598, 602 (2008).
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Compare Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602, with Olech, 528
U.S. at 564.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10.
94. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Court exercises virtually no oversight over special legislation
related to spending. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273–74 (1954) (per curiam) (“The
power of Congress to dispose of any kind of property belonging to the United States ‘is
vested in Congress without limitation.’” (quoting United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
526, 537 (1840))); see also Comment, supra note 18, at 718–23. Although the Court has
suggested that the General Welfare Clause limits appropriations to expenditures designed “to
provide for the general welfare,” it has consigned the “general welfare” determination to
Congress’s discretion so long as Congress has not exercised “arbitrary power.” Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 632, 640 (1937). Accordingly, courts have “stretched to find public
purposes in the most dubious spending schemes.” Richard Delgado, Inequality “From the
Top”: Applying an Ancient Prohibition to an Emerging Problem of Distributive Justice, 32
UCLA L. REV. 100, 106 (1984).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court has recognized that “the sovereign may not take
the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even
though A is paid just compensation.” Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
However, the Court has limited the application of the Takings Clause, holding that “a State
may transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the
purpose of the taking.” Id. at 477, 488–89.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
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cases under these provisions, the Court has formulated a number of
different tests, applied different standards, and deferred to the
legislature in varying degrees, depending on the clause invoked and the
subject matter of the legislation. For example, the Court provides
almost no protection against special legislation related to public
spending98 or immigration,99 and minimal protections against special
legislation in the equal protection context.100 By contrast, the Court
provides more significant protections in the context of takings101 and
criminal law.102 As a result of this multifarious and inconsistent
approach to dealing with special legislation, jurisprudence surrounding
special legislation lacks coherence.
a. Lack of Coherence Between Special Benefit and Special Detriment
Legislation
Supreme Court doctrine draws a sharp distinction between laws
imposing special detriments and those providing special benefits. The

29−31 (1977) (holding that the Contract Clause prevents government self-dealing by
prohibiting the states from breaching contracts to which they are a party in order to gain
advantages for the government at the expense of the contracting party); see Evan C. Zoldan,
The Permanent Seat of Government: An Unintended Consequence of Heightened Scrutiny
Under the Contract Clause, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 208–09 (2011).
97. Rooted in the principle of separation of powers, the Court has held that Congress
may not prescribe a rule of decision in a pending court case. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 128, 143–46 (1872) (Congress may not deny federal courts jurisdiction “founded
solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending”). Despite this prohibition,
the Court’s reaction to laws that address particular cases have been mixed. In Miller, the
Court limited Klein, holding Congress is not prohibited from directing the court to alter an
injunction previously entered by the court. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000).
98. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J.
345, 356–57 (2008).
99. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“At the outset, it is important to underscore
the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly
emphasized that ‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.” (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); see also James E. Pfander & Theresa R. Wardon,
Reclaiming the Immigration Constitution of the Early Republic: Prospectivity, Uniformity, and
Transparency, 96 VA. L. REV. 359, 429–30 (2010).
100. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam).
101. Compare Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977) (holding that the
legislature can create a “legitimate class of one” as long as the distinction is “fairly . . .
understood”), with Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (the legislature
cannot “take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party
B, even though A is paid just compensation”).
102. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867).
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Court provides some protections against special detriment legislation
under the Bill of Attainder, Takings, Ex Post Facto, and Equal
Protection Clauses.103
However, no similar doctrine provides
restrictions against special benefit legislation.104 As a result, special
benefit legislation—like special immigration laws, laws providing civil
and criminal immunity, and laws providing financial benefits to named
parties—is subject to virtually no scrutiny under the Court’s current
jurisprudence. The incoherence of this doctrine is elucidated in the
following example: as noted, Congress recently provided a $174,000
gratuitous payment to Bonnie Englebardt Lautenberg, the widow of the
late United States Senator Frank Lautenberg.105 This special benefit
raises no constitutional concerns under the Court’s current doctrine.
However, if Congress had enacted a law taking $174,000 from Mrs.
Lautenberg, such a statute would raise concerns under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and
possibly the Ex Post Facto Clause. In other words, the Court’s doctrine
provides strikingly different protections against special legislation
depending on whether the legislation imposes detriments or provides
benefits.
b. Lack of Coherence Between Criminal Laws and Civil Laws
Supreme Court doctrine distinguishes between special laws
denominated as criminal and those denominated as civil. Although the
Court restrains some special criminal laws under the Bill of Attainder
and Ex Post Facto Clauses, it does not recognize analogous restrictions
in the civil context.106 The following example demonstrates the
incoherence of this distinction: in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act (FERA) Amendments to the False Claims Act (FCA), Congress
retroactively revived particular lawsuits dismissed pursuant to a narrow
interpretation of the FCA.107 Courts are split, however, as to whether

103. E.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469; Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472–73;
Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323.
104. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792; Bagenstos, supra note 98, at 356–57; see also Alabama v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273–74 (1954); Pfander & Wardon, supra note 99, at 429–30.
105. Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565
(2013).
106. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.); Nixon, 433
U.S. at 472–73.
107. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4, 123 Stat.
1617, 1621–25 (2009); S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4, 10–12 (2009).
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the FCA is a “criminal” law within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Because the Ex Post Facto Clause extends only to criminal
laws, only courts holding that the FCA is criminal have invalidated the
revival of the dismissed FCA suits; by contrast, courts holding that the
FCA is civil uphold the revival of these same suits.108
c. Lack of Coherence Between State Laws and Federal Laws
Finally, the Court draws a distinction between state laws and federal
laws that single out individuals for special treatment. When either a
state or the federal government breaches a public contract, that is, a
contract to which it is itself a party, it reallocates a burden that properly
belongs to the entire body politic onto the contractor alone. When a
breach of this sort occurs through the enactment of a statute, therefore,
it properly can be called special legislation because the breach affects
particular contracts and known parties.109 However, despite the fact that
a breach of a public contract reallocates burdens to known individuals
irrespective of whether the contracting party is a state or the federal
government, the Court treats breaches of public contract by the states
differently than breaches by Congress. A state’s ability to breach its
own contractual obligations is narrowly limited to circumstances in
which the law is “reasonable” and “necessary” to implement an
“important public purpose.”110 By contrast, Congress is permitted to
breach a contract to which it is itself a party unless it has committed
“unmistakably” to bind its sovereign legislative power by contract,111 a
far more lenient standard. As a result, two otherwise identical contracts,
and otherwise identical special laws breaching those contracts, will be
subject to widely divergent legal standards depending on whether a state

108. Compare United States v. Hawley, 812 F. Supp. 2d 949, 961–62 (N.D. Iowa 2011)
(holding that the FERA Amendments are unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause
because they are retroactive and punitive), and United States ex rel. Baker v. Cmty. Health
Sys., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1112 (D.N.M. 2010) (same), and United States ex rel. Sanders
v. Allison Engine Co., 667 F. Supp. 2d 747, 753–54 (S.D. Ohio 2009), with United States ex rel.
Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 608 F.3d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the
Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the FCA), and United States ex rel. Drake v. NSI,
Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d 489, 502 (D. Conn 2010) (same).
109. Zoldan, supra note 96, at 209.
110. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). The constitutional
basis for the much-criticized United States Trust doctrine is the Contract Clause, which applies
only against the states, not the federal government.
111. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 871–72 (1996).
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or the federal government was the public entity that breached its
obligation.
B. Scholars Have Not Formulated a Robust Theory of Constitutional
Protections Against Special Legislation.
Because the Court has failed to conceptualize special legislation as a
category of law deserving scrutiny because of its particularized effect, it
is perhaps not surprising that scholars have failed to provide a robust
constitutional theory that would protect against special legislation.
There are three main lines of scholarship addressing special legislation:
equal protection, state constitutional restrictions, and individual
substantive legal areas. Although each of these lines of scholarship
addresses some aspects of the problem of special legislation, each fails to
provide an approach that connects the text of the Constitution with the
historical experiences of the generation that framed that text and with
the philosophical traditions that gave rise to it. The principle introduced
in this Article contributes to a lively but unresolved debate over
constitutional restraints on special legislation by offering an approach
that is based on the text of the Constitution, its philosophical
underpinnings, and the history leading up to its framing.
Scholars seeking to articulate federal constitutional restrictions on
special legislation primarily advocate an expansive reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.112 A number of
scholars have argued that the Equal Protection Clause should be read
more broadly than an anti-discrimination device, instead focusing on the
clause’s potential to eliminate all class-based distinctions.113 Professor
Balkin, for example, has argued that the Equal Protection Clause should
be read to prohibit “class legislation,” codifying a pre-Civil War idea
that “‘special’ or ‘partial’ legislation that picked out a group for special
benefits or special burdens” violated principles of equality.114 Professor
Balkin’s argument is closely related to work by Professors Saunders and
Nourse, who connect the Equal Protection Clause with the antebellum

112. Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1246–47; Saunders, supra note 17, at 288–90; see also
Balkin, supra note 18, at 315–16; Goldberg, supra note 19, at 528–30; Nourse & Maguire,
supra note 19, at 959–65, 995–96.
113. Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1246–47; Saunders, supra note 17, at 254–55; see also
Goldberg, supra note 19, at 528–30; Nourse & Maguire, supra note 19, at 959–65, 995–96;
Balkin, supra note 18, at 315–16.
114. Balkin, supra note 18, at 315.
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tradition that citizens are entitled to be governed by general, as opposed
to special, laws.115 As Professor Saunders describes, in the decades
leading up the ratification of the Equal Protection Clause, special laws
were considered offensive because they benefitted one individual or
group at the expense of the rest of the population, undermining equality
and fostering faction and corruption.116 Although this line of scholarship
does provide a link between the American aversion to special legislation
and a clause of the Constitution, it fails to connect this aversion to the
numerous provisions in the Constitution other than the Equal
Protection Clause that demonstrate a commitment to the limitation of
special laws, including, most importantly, the Bill of Attainder, Title of
Nobility, and Ex Post Facto Clauses. It also fails to connect the text of
the Constitution to the historical experiences that gave rise to the
inclusion of all of these clauses in the Constitution.
A second line of scholarship focuses on state constitutional
restrictions on special legislation. Professor Long has argued that
interpretations of state constitutional provisions restricting special
legislation defer to the legislature in imitation of weak federal
protections under the Equal Protection Clause.117 Professor Long
argues that the incorporation of equal protection jurisprudence into
state special legislation doctrine, and the resulting deference to state
legislatures, is unnecessary. Somewhat in tension with Professors
Balkin, Nourse, and Saunders, Professor Long argues that the concerns
motivating the ratification of the Equal Protection Clause differed from
those motivating state constitutional restrictions on special legislation.
As a result, he argues, state courts should be free to interpret their state
constitutional provisions independently of, and potentially more broadly
than, federal Equal Protection doctrine.118 Because this line of
scholarship focuses on the historical backdrop to state constitutional
provisions that address special legislation, it is inadequate to address the
problem of special legislation enacted by Congress. It also fails to take
into account the many provisions of the federal Constitution that
address special laws and the historical backdrop that precipitated their
inclusion in the document’s text.
A third line of scholarship has identified the individual clauses of the
115.
116.
117.
118.

Nourse & Maguire, supra note 19, at 959–65; Saunders, supra note 17, at 252–53.
Saunders, supra note 17, at 252–55.
Long, supra note 26, at 742; see also Rubin, supra note 18, at 405.
See Long, supra note 26, at 742–43.

2014]

REVIVING LEGISLATIVE GENERALITY

649

Constitution that are well-suited to address the problem of special
legislation. Based on one or more of these clauses, these scholars have
suggested an expanded role for courts reviewing special laws.119 For
example, scholars interpreting the Bill of Attainder Clauses have argued
that they best can be viewed as a way to prohibit laws that impose a
variety of disabilities on known, identifiable groups.120 Other scholars
have suggested that the Title of Nobility Clauses might restrict the
government from participating in the private development and
distribution of “biological benefits,” such as “organ transplants, life
extension, [and] cloning,”121 or prohibit states from granting special
consideration to legacy candidates for admission to public universities.122
In the realm of spending, a number of scholars have argued that the
general welfare restriction on the Spending Clause could be used by
courts to police special spending legislation more aggressively.123 Others
view immigration as a special case, noting that special immigration
statutes, but probably not other types of special legislation, are
prohibited by the Constitution.124 Although this line of scholarship does
reflect the many clauses of the Constitution that relate to special
119. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, “Democratic Despotism” and Constitutional Constraint:
An Empirical Analysis of Ex Post Facto Claims in State Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
439, 498–99 (2004); Robert G. Natelson, Statutory Retroactivity: The Founders’ View, 39
IDAHO L. REV. 489, 523, 529 (2003); Laura Ricciardi & Michael B.W. Sinclair, Retroactive
Civil Legislation, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 301, 376–77 (1996).
120. Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws, Bills of Attainder, and the Definition of
Punishment: On DOMA, the Hawaii Amendment, and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48
SYRACUSE L. REV. 227, 228 (1998). Other commentators have argued that the Bill of
Attainder Clause is best understood as a shield for political activity otherwise protected by
the First Amendment, Thomas B. Griffith, Note, Beyond Process: A Substantive Rationale for
the Bill of Attainder Clause, 70 VA. L. REV. 475, 476 (1984), or a guarantee of neutral judicial
process, Jane Welsh, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Unqualified Guarantee of
Process, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 77, 80 (1983).
121. Delgado, supra note 94, at 101, 127. Professor Delgado describes that the Court’s
equal protection cases limiting certain types of state-sponsored giving seem to “result in
invalidation of programs that confer benefits permanently and unreviewably; that establish
groups apt to be perceived as privileged or ‘special’; and that create closed classes.” Id. at
106.
122. Carlton F.W. Larson, Titles of Nobility, Hereditary Privilege, and the
Unconstitutionality of Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
1375 (2006).
123. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 98, at 356–57; Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review
of Special Interest Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the
Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239, 274–76 (2007); see also Lynn A. Baker, The Spending
Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195, 198 (2001).
124. Pfander & Wardon, supra note 99, at 399.
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legislation, by emphasizing only one or more clauses individually, it fails
to identify the coherent principle that animates all of these clauses.
Moreover, it fails to recognize the historical circumstances and
philosophical traditions that link these clauses to one another.
This Article contributes to the three lines of scholarship noted
above, which focus alternately on the Equal Protection Clause, state
constitutional provisions, and individual substantive areas of law, by
articulating a robust and coherent constitutional principle restraining
special legislation.
The principle restraining special legislation
articulated in this Article has its foundations in the history of the
framing of the Constitution, the text of the Constitution itself, and the
philosophical traditions underpinning the Constitution. As a result, the
principle articulated in this Article offers a number of contributions to
the existing literature.
It makes sense of under-enforced, but
undoubtedly important, clauses of the Constitution; it connects these
constitutional clauses with the historical backdrop and philosophical
principles that motivated their inclusion in the Constitution; it applies
coherently across different substantive areas of law; and it applies
seamlessly both to state legislatures and Congress. This principle, the
constitutional value of legislative generality, is described in Part IV,
below.
IV. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE VALUE OF LEGISLATIVE GENERALITY
Both Congress and state legislatures routinely enact special
legislation, and neither the Supreme Court nor scholars have articulated
a principle requiring courts to exercise coherent and meaningful judicial
review over it. Nevertheless, a value that disfavors special legislation
should be enforced as an independent constitutional principle. This
principle, which may be called the value of legislative generality,125 is
supported by three distinct, but related, pillars—history, constitutional
text, and philosophical considerations. First, the history of the
revolutionary period leading up to the framing of the Constitution
suggests that a key purpose of the Constitution was to address evils
associated with special legislation. Second, the Constitution contains a
number of under-enforced clauses that, when read together and in
context, delineate a norm of legislative generality.
Third, an

125. This principle, and its connection to the Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, Title of
Nobility, and Contract Clauses, was introduced in Zoldan, supra note 96, at 207–08.
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interpretation of the Constitution that includes a value of legislative
generality fits well with a number of philosophical traditions and leads
to normatively attractive results. Together, these pillars support the
conclusion that legislative generality is a value with constitutional
weight and suggest that current constitutional doctrine should be
modified to give effect to this value. Each of these three pillars will be
sketched briefly in this Part. Part V will fully articulate the historical
basis for the value of legislative generality. The other two pillars—the
text of the Constitution and philosophical and normative
considerations—will be fully articulated in later work.
A. The Historical Basis for a Value of Legislative Generality
Modern special laws, including the special detriment and special
benefit laws described above, strongly resemble special legislation
enacted during the colonial and revolutionary periods. Members of the
revolutionary generation suffered from special legislation enacted by
Parliament and, in the years after independence, by their own state
legislatures. This special legislation came in the form of special
detriment legislation, like bills of attainder126 and laws confiscating
property.127 It also came in the form of special benefit legislation,
including laws immunizing named individuals from civil suit,128 nullifying
judgments already rendered against them,129 providing immunity from
criminal prosecution,130 and granting legislative divorces.131

126. See CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 93; WOOD, supra note 66, at 279; Comment, supra
note 66, at 330–31.
127. E.g., An Act to Compel Non-Residents to Return Within a Certain Time or in
Default Thereof, That Their Estates Be Confiscated, and for Confiscating the Estate of
William Knox, Esq. Formerly Provost Marshal, of the Then Province, Now State of Georgia
(1778), in 19 (pt. 2) THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 126, 126–27
(Allen D. Chandler ed., 1911); An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Sundry Persons Therein
Named, ch. 19 (1778), in 4 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 191, 191–93 (Henry Harrison Metcalf
ed., 1916); An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Certain Notorious Conspirators Against the
Government and Liberties of the Inhabitants of the Late Province, Now State, of
Massachusetts Bay, ch. 48 (1778), in 5 THE ACTS AND RESOLVES, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, OF
THE PROVINCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 966, 966–67 (Boston, Wright & Potter
Printing Co. 1886) [hereinafter ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY]. In
many cases, the confiscations were directed at Tories, who also saw their ability to practice
their professions curtailed by opportunistic Whig legislatures. BAILYN, supra note 61, at 302;
LEVY, supra note 61, at 71; Trent, supra note 61, at 454.
128. E.g., Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53, 54 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786); VERMONT
REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70.
129. VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70; see also Timothy A. Lawrie,
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Wearied by a decade of special laws, and recalling the history of
abusive special legislation enacted by Parliament, the revolutionary
generation ultimately rejected special legislation, denouncing state
legislatures for “extending their deliberations to the cases of
individuals.”132 They rejected all manner of special laws, including those
“amend[ing] titles to land,” “dissolving . . . the bonds of marriage,”
attainting suspects of crimes, granting state benefits to citizens,133 and
deciding pending legal disputes.134
The revolutionary generation
rejected the power of the legislature to declare named individuals
ineligible for the protections of the standing laws.135 Popular opinion
disclaimed the right of the legislature “to give monopolies of legal
privilege—to bestow unequal portions of our common inheritance on
favourites.”136 By the close of the confederation period, both special
privileges and special detriments were considered “repugnant to the
spirit of the American republics.”137 It was with these experiences, and
in large part driven by them, that the framers of the Constitution arrived
in Philadelphia in 1787.138
Interpretation and Authority: Separation of Powers and the Judiciary’s Battle for Independence
in New Hampshire, 1786–1818, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 315 (1995).
130. E.g., VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 70.
131. E.g., id. at 60.
132. COUNCIL OF CENSORS, A REPORT [hereinafter PENNSYLVANIA REPORT], in THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 35, 38 (Philadelphia, Francis
Bailey 1784).
133. Id. at 41, 46–48, 57, 59.
134. Id. at 40.
135. See The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution [hereinafter Convention of Virginia], in 3 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 1, 66–67 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES].
136. WOOD, supra note 66, at 402 (quoting DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA 130 (Mathew Carey ed., 1786) [hereinafter
PENNSYLVANIA DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS]) (internal quotation marks omitted); George
P. Smith, II, Dr. Bonham’s Case and the Modern Significance of Lord Coke’s Influence, 41
WASH. L. REV. 297, 304–05 (1966) (noting that Coke believed that all monopolies were
rendered unlawful by the Magna Charta).
137. WOOD, supra note 66, at 401; James Madison, Title for the President (May 11,
1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 154, 155–56 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A.
Rutland eds., 1979).
138. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1995); EDWARD S. CORWIN,
THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 36–37, 62 (Peter Smith 1963) (1914) [hereinafter
CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW]; EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE CONSTITUTION 148–50 (1919) [hereinafter CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
CONSTITUTION]; EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 70–71 (1948)
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B. The Textual Support for a Value of Legislative Generality.
The text of the Constitution memorializes the aversion to special
legislation, and the commitment to the value of legislative generality,
that the framers of the Constitution developed through hard experience
during the confederation period. Much like the principles of separation
of powers139 or the right to privacy,140 the value of legislative generality is
not found in any single clause of the Constitution in isolation. Rather,
the value can be gleaned by reading a number of related clauses of the
Constitution together. These clauses, covering subject matters as
diverse as public records, immigration, and criminal law, together
suggest a constitutional norm of legislative generality. In particular, the
Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, and Title of Nobility Clauses, all of
which restrain both Congress as well as state legislatures, embody a
value of legislative generality and properly may be called the “generality
clauses” of the Constitution.
Among the generality clauses, the Bill of Attainder Clauses141 most
explicitly address the practice of singling out individuals or small groups
for special treatment. Reflecting the recognition that the legislature,
unrestrained by precedent, reason, or rules of evidence, can punish
individuals for running afoul of the popular will,142 the clauses prevent
the majority from burdening individuals unable to protect themselves
through normal political processes. The clauses restrict both the state
legislatures and Congress from singling out an individual or small,
known group for special detriments like death, banishment, the
confiscation of property, and exclusion from one’s profession.143
The Title of Nobility Clauses144 are the mirror image of the Bill of
Attainder Clauses, supporting the value of legislative generality by
prohibiting both Congress and state legislatures from granting certain
special benefits to individuals or small, determinable groups. Certainly,
[hereinafter CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT].
139. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that the principle of
separation of powers is “woven” into the Constitution and can be discerned by reading
together a number of the Constitution’s clauses).
140. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (although the “Constitution does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy,” this right can be gleaned from reading a number of
provisions of the Constitution).
141. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10.
142. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441–42 (1965).
143. See id.
144. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10.
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the clauses prohibit the granting of literal titles, like “dukes, marquesses,
earls, viscounts and barons.”145 However, in light of the manifold legal
and economic privileges that are associated with the English nobility,146
a more plausible reading of the clauses includes preventing the
establishment of both a literal titled nobility, as well as a functional
nobility imbued with these special privileges.
The Ex Post Facto Clauses operate as a check against special
legislation by preventing the legislature from doing indirectly what it
cannot do directly because of the Bill of Attainder or Title of Nobility
Clauses. When a legislature enacts retroactive legislation, it acts with
the knowledge of conduct that already has occurred. As a result, the
ability to enact retroactive legislation permits the legislature to punish
or benefit an individual without naming him specifically but with the
knowledge of whom the legislation will benefit or harm.147 The case of
Harry Bridges is an explicit, but far from unique, example of the use of a
retrospective law to single out an individual for punishment. Amidst
anti-Communist fervor, the United States House of Representatives
passed a special bill directing the deportation of Harry Bridges.148 When
it became clear that the special law would be considered an
unconstitutional bill of attainder, a new bill was introduced that did not
use Bridges’s name specifically but retroactively made his conduct a
deportable offense.149 Removing all doubt about the intent of the
retroactive law, the author of the second bill introduced it in the
following way: “It is my joy to announce that this bill will do . . . what
the bill specifically aimed at the deportation of Harry Bridges seeks to
accomplish. This bill changes the law so that the Department of Justice
should now have little trouble in deporting Harry Bridges.”150 The
second bill, designed to reach the conduct of a particular individual,
145. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 303
(Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publ’g 2001).
146. Id. at 390. These special privileges include the freedom from arrest for civil cases,
privileges in judicial proceedings, and the freedom from being subjected to judgment by a jury
made up of commoners. Id.
147. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693 (1960).
148. H.R. 9766, 76th CONG. (3d Sess. 1940); Roberts, supra note 71, at 1387; see, e.g.,
Comment, In re Harry Bridges, 52 YALE L.J. 108, 109–10 (1942).
149. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 158 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“As a
substitute for this direct legislative assault upon Bridges, Congress amended the deportation
law” to reach him indirectly.).
150. 86 CONG. REC. 9031 (1940).
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became the law, leading to the institution of deportation proceedings
against Bridges.151 As the Bridges case elucidates, the prohibition of
retrospective laws, a right protected by the Ex Post Facto Clauses,
prevents the legislature from making an end-run around the Bill of
Attainder and Title of Nobility Clauses to benefit or harm known
individuals. Perhaps not surprisingly, during the republic’s early years,
the Ex Post Facto Clauses were viewed as the primary constitutional
source for the prevention of special legislation.152
The connection among the generality clauses, and the fact that they
all address different aspects of the same problem of special legislation, is
reflected in early cases that defined them. Describing the connection
among the generality clauses in Ogden v. Saunders, the Court held that
the “collocation” of these clauses together, in Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution, reveals that these clauses are “members of the same family
brought together in the most intimate connexion with each other.”153
They must be read together because the “spirit and motives of these
prohibitions . . . agree in the principle which suggested them.”154 The
principle alluded to in Saunders was made explicitly in Fletcher v. Peck,
in which Chief Justice Marshall opined, “It is the peculiar province of
the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society;
the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be
the duty of other departments.”155
In addition to the Bill of Attainder, Title of Nobility, and Ex Post
Facto Clauses, which most specifically disfavor special laws, the
Constitution also contains a number of other clauses that imply a norm
of generality in legislation. For example, the Appointments Clause
denies Congress the right to exercise the power of appointment of
officers that was so abused by the state legislatures during the
confederation period.156 Other constitutional clauses that suggest a

151. Bridges, 326 U.S. at 158–59 (Murphy, J., concurring).
152. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 138, at 148–50.
Congress was far from innovative in using retrospective laws to reach an individual who could
not be punished through the normal legal processes. In England, Parliament used
retrospective laws in order to punish public ministers who had run afoul of Parliament’s
graces but committed no illegal act. CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 111–13.
153. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 265–66 (1827).
154. Id. at 267.
155. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (emphasis added).
156. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; WOOD, supra, note 66, at 145; 2 FARRAND, supra
note 1, at 314–15.
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norm of legislative generality include the General Welfare,157
Naturalization,158 and Bankruptcy Clauses,159 all of which suggest that
Congress’s power to enact legislation in these areas is limited to uniform
laws.
Constitutional amendments, too, including the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, suggest a norm of legislative generality.
In conclusion, although the Constitution contains no single clause
that guarantees that state legislatures and Congress will enact only
generally applicable laws, a number of clauses, when read together,
suggest that one of the goals of the Constitution is the avoidance of
legislative specification. In future work, I will further elaborate on the
textual basis for the value of legislative generality, focusing on the
clauses most well-suited to support a value of legislative generality.
C. The Philosophical Underpinnings of a Value of Legislative
Generality
It is not surprising that the text of the Constitution and the history
leading up to its framing support a value of legislative generality;
indeed, there is a long tradition among jurists and philosophers of law
that excludes special legislation from the definition of law and
recognizes legislative generality as a normatively attractive value.
Traditionally, scholars and philosophers of law drew a sharp distinction
between rules that apply to the population generally and rules that
apply only to a single individual. William Blackstone160 and John
Locke161 argued that a rule that applies to a single individual simply falls
outside the definition of “law.” Blackstone reasoned that an act of the
legislature must be “universal” to qualify as a law; if it applies to one
157. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See also The Preamble to the United States
Constitution, which declares that a purpose of the union of the states is to “promote the
general welfare.”
158. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
159. Id.
160. Blackstone’s Commentaries, widely read by educated members of the
revolutionary period, “undoubtedly influenced American thinking” about legislative power.
CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 95–96; see also CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, supra
note 138, at 54.
161. John Locke’s writings on natural rights and the social contract were cited in
“pamphlet after pamphlet” by American writers of the revolutionary generation. BAILYN,
supra note 61, at 27. Locke was studied by James Wilson and was quoted in influential
reports written by the Pennsylvania Council of Censors and the Vermont Council of Censors.
PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 37; VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 63.
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person alone, it “has no relation to the community in general” and is
therefore “rather a sentence than a law.”162 Locke agreed, arguing that,
even to be considered a law, a rule must be “common to every one of
that society”;163 the legislature therefore was constrained to promulgate
“one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country
man at plough.”164
Modern philosophers of law have adopted and reasserted this basic
principle that the definition of law simply does not include orders to
individuals. Lon Fuller describes generality in law as a precondition to
the existence of a legal system. In The Morality of Law, in order to
elucidate the features of legality, Fuller describes the ways in which an
attempt at lawmaking may fail.165 Fuller argues that the first and most
obvious failure of a legal system is the inability to promulgate general
rules of conduct. Because it fails to provide notice to guide future
conduct and fails to uphold the expectations of those who are bound by
it, even a perfectly fair and equitable system of adjudication cannot
properly be called a legal system in the absence of generally applicable
laws. As a result, Fuller calls the generality of law the “first desideratum
of a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.”166
Moreover, scholars assessing the normative implications of special
legislation conclude that they are immoral and lead to a variety of
societal harms. Cicero described laws that single out an individual for
special treatment, even laws that confer special benefits, as “unjust.”167
David Hume168 was particularly critical of laws that exempted the
powerful of society from the general applicability of the laws.169

162. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at 33.
163. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 22 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980).
164. Id. § 142.
165. FULLER, supra note 2, at 46–48.
166. Id. at 46.
167. CICERO, supra note 3, at 173.
168. David Hume’s writings strongly influenced, among others, Wilson, Madison, and
Hamilton. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION
60–61 (2000) (Hamilton); Douglas Adair, “That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science”: David
Hume, James Madison, and The Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 343, 346–49
(1957) (Madison); William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 902–04 (2008) (Wilson).
169. DAVID HUME, Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences, in POLITICAL
ESSAYS 58, 62–63 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 1994).

658

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:625

Algernon Sidney170 went even further, arguing that the liberty of
England’s Saxon ancestors was predicated on the requirement that
legislators could not exempt themselves from the generally applicable
laws.171
Ultimately, the consistency with which special laws have been
condemned, and the repeated articulation of a value of legislative
generality by philosophers of law, is no doubt closely linked to the
harms associated with special legislation and the normative benefits that
will result from its diminution. The value of legislative generality is
normatively attractive because the power to enact special laws is closely
linked with corruption,172 the unequal treatment of similar cases,173 the
failure to reform broken statutory schemes,174 encroachment on the
judicial function,175 and a host of other harms.
To take just one example of a harm closely associated with special
laws, special legislation long has been linked to quid pro quo corruption.
In the notorious “Abscam” scandal, a number of Congressmen were
implicated in a scheme to introduce special legislation in exchange for
bribes.176 In the Abscam investigation, FBI agents claimed to represent
two wealthy Arab sheiks who desired to immigrate to the United
States.177 The agents met a number of federal officials, including United
States Congressmen, who promised to introduce private immigration

170. Algernon Sidney, a republican theorist and opponent of monarchical influence in
England, was widely read by the Framers and was quoted by Joseph Story in his
Commentaries on the Constitution.
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 36–37 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991). Sidney’s
writings also helped the colonists, inexperienced at nation-building, ground their increasingly
radical politics in political philosophy. BAILYN, supra note 61, at 34–35, 53–54.
171. ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 569–72 (Thomas
G. West ed., LibertyClassics 1990).
172. CHARLES CHAUNCEY BINNEY, RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL
LEGISLATION IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1894).
173. See, e.g., Terri’s Law, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
174. E.g., Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523
(2010); Priv. L. No. 108-6, 118 Stat. 4032 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-4, 118 Stat. 4028 (2004); Priv.
L. No. 108-3, 118 Stat. 4026 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-1, 118 Stat. 4023 (2004); Priv. L. No. 1075, 116 Stat. 3123 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-1, 115 Stat. 2471 (2001) (all granting exemptions
from the Immigration and Nationality Act).
175. E.g., Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-272, § 2,
120 Stat. 770, 770–72 (2006).
176. Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91
YALE L.J. 1565, 1571–72 (1982).
177. Id.
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legislation to allow the fictitious sheiks to immigrate to the United
States without having to comply with the generally applicable
immigration laws.178 In all, twenty-five people, including one United
States Senator and six United States Representatives, were indicted for
corruption related to the Abscam investigation.179 The bribery at issue
in the Abscam scandal was only possible because of the power of the
legislature to enact special laws. Because Congress is permitted to
admit individual aliens in derogation of the standing immigration laws, a
market exists for individuals to influence—and in this case bribe—
members of Congress to introduce bills to provide them with special
legislative treatment. A value of legislative generality that prohibits the
legislature from providing special laws would eliminate this type of
bribery by eliminating the supply of special legislative favors that can be
bought.
Of course, whether a value of special legislation is normatively
attractive depends on whether it can be applied in a way that eliminates
harmful special legislation without creating other undesired results. The
value of legislative generality articulated by jurists and philosophers of
law leaves open a few key questions: Must a law apply to everyone to be
sufficiently general? Should a legislature be prohibited from enacting
special laws if only the effect, but not the intent, is to confer special
treatment? Should there be any exceptions for curative laws or
emergency situations? The scope of this Article precludes a thorough
evaluation of normative arguments about the desirability of special
legislation in limited circumstances. In future work, I will describe the
harms created by special legislation and evaluate the extent to which
some special legislation can be justified on normative grounds.
Taken together, the historical, textual, and philosophical arguments
outlined in this Part support the conclusion that a value of legislative
generality should be recognized as an enforceable constitutional value.
Each of these three pillars warrants further elaboration. The textual
support and philosophical underpinnings will be addressed in future

178. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d 692 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1982); Gershman, supra note 176, at 1572–75.
179. Gershman, supra note 176, at 1575; see also LEE, supra note 27, at 9 (“Abscam,
involving payoffs for the sponsorship of private immigration laws, culminated in the expulsion
of one Member of the House of Representatives . . . .”). Corruption related to private laws
has existed in the context of private bills since before the ratification of the Constitution.
Pfander & Wardon, supra note 99, at 431.
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work; the principal subject of this Article, the historical basis for the
value of legislative generality, is articulated in Part V, below.
V. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR A VALUE OF LEGISLATIVE
GENERALITY
The Constitution’s structure and provisions were informed not only
by logic and political philosophy, but also, and perhaps most directly, by
the experiences of the revolutionary generation in the years leading up
to the framing of the Constitution.180 A thorough understanding of the
revolutionary period, therefore, can inform our understanding of the
conditions that gave rise to the Constitution’s text and help guide, even
if it does not compel, our interpretation of this text. Reviewing the
history of this period strongly suggests that the Constitution was
designed, in part, to remedy evils associated with special legislation.
Before independence, colonial Americans viewed their legislatures
as the protectors of their liberties against abuses by the royal governors
and judges, who were representatives of the monarchy and seen to
represent the monarchy’s interests.181 The people viewed their state
legislatures as the institutional descendants of Parliament,182 which, since
its protracted battle for sovereignty with the British Crown,183 had been
considered the protector of the rights of the people.184 Indeed, because
the people placed so much trust in their legislatures, by the time of the
revolution, the notion of “tyranny by the people was theoretically
inconceivable.”185 It was only natural then that in the years immediately
after the revolution the people of the United States emphasized their

180. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 138, at 147–50.
Although Justice Holmes described the development of the common law when he wrote that
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,” the adage applies perhaps
with equal force to constitutional law. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2009).
181. BAILYN, supra note 61, at 163–64; CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW,
supra note 138, at 35; WOOD, supra note 66, at 598.
182. CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 36.
183. Id. at 28–29. After the Glorious Revolution, the view that Parliament could create
as well as implement law gained ascendancy. BAILYN, supra note 61, at 201. Through
Blackstone’s writings, this view was transmitted to the American colonies. CHAFEE, supra
note 66, at 95–96.
184. BAILYN, supra note 61, at 285–86. Of the House of Commons, Thomas Paine
wrote that on its “virtue depends the freedom of England.” Id. (quoting THOMAS PAINE,
COMMON SENSE 5 (Peter Eckler Publ’g. 1918)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
185. WOOD, supra note 66, at 62.
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freedom from monarchical rule by structuring their new state
governments to exalt rather than to restrain legislative power.186 In the
spate of constitution-making that occurred after the revolution, the
states focused on ensuring that the legislatures represented the will of
the people and did not consider the dangers of unchecked democracy.187
State constitutions elevated the position of their legislatures to the
detriment, almost to the exclusion, of their executive and judicial
branches.188 By failing to recognize the potential for abuse by the
people, the revolutionary generation laid the institutional foundation for
the runaway legislative abuses of the confederation period.189
Ultimately, the unbridled legislative power unleashed after the
revolution introduced the people of the United States to the dangers of
special legislation.
After a decade of experiencing the harms
precipitated by the power to make special laws, both elite and ordinary
members of the revolutionary generation denounced special legislation
and articulated a value of legislative generality. Indeed, there was
perhaps no factor that more directly motivated the calling of the
Philadelphia Convention than the recognition, after this first, long
decade of independence, of the evils that result from unchecked
legislative power to enact special laws.190
A. Special Legislation in Confederation-Era America
The legislative abuses wrought by the revolutionary generation came
largely in the form of special legislation.191 The new state legislatures,
unrestrained by their constitutions or coordinate branches of
government, and emboldened by the ideology that the will of the people
alone—for the first time unencumbered by Crown or Nobles—was

186. CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 35–36; see THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309–10 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
187. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 186, at 309–10 (James Madison).
188. CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 36–37; see THE
FEDERALIST NOS. 48–49, supra note 186, at 309–10, 313 (James Madison).
189. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 48–49, supra note 186, at 309–10, 313 (James
Madison).
190. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 220–21 (1995); CORWIN, DOCTRINE
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 36–37, 62; CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 138, at 148–50; CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT,
supra note 138, at 70–71.
191. WOOD, supra note 66, at 155–56, 191–95, 279, 404; CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST
GOVERNMENT, supra note 138, at 70–71.
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sovereign, routinely enacted special laws.192 These special laws enacted
by the revolutionary generation both imposed special detriments and
provided special benefits.
1. Special Detriment Legislation
The history of the early republic is replete with stories of special
detriment legislation. Most well-known are the countless bills of
attainder, in which suspected Tories193 or other social undesirables194
were singled out by statute and sentenced to death or banishment by
their state legislatures without judicial process.195 The motivation for
these attainders varied. In some cases, the legislatures desired to
confiscate property.196 In one case, a tavern keeper was threatened with
banishment for allegedly insulting a legislator, a credible threat in that
climate of legislative omnipotence.197 The Virginia Assembly’s stated
purpose in attainting Josiah Philips and his gang was to avoid “the
delays which would attend the proceeding to outlaw the said offenders,
according to the usual forms and procedures of the courts of law.”198
Summarizing the mood of Virginia’s legislature at the time of the
attainder of Philips, Patrick Henry defended the decision: Philips,
declared Henry, was not entitled to “beautiful legal ceremonies”
because it was well-known that he was “a fugitive murderer and an

192. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219–21; PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 40–59;
VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70; CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT,
supra note 138, at 70–71.
193. Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788); An Act for Disposing of
Certain Estates, and Banishing Certain Persons, Therein Mentioned, no. 1153 (1782), in 4
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 516, 516–17 (Thomas Cooper ed.,
Columbia, A.S. Johnston 1838); CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 97; LEVY, supra note 61, at 71–72.
194. E.g., An Act to Attaint Josiah Phillips and Others, Unless They Render
Themselves to Justice Within a Certain Time, ch. 12 (1778), in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF
VIRGINIA, supra note 68, at 463–64; Trent, supra note 61, at 444–54.
195. See CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 93; WOOD, supra note 66, at 279; Comment, supra
note 66, at 330–31.
196. E.g., An Act In Addition to an Act Intituled “An Act to Confiscate the Estates of
Sundry Persons Therein Named,” ch. 8 (1779), in 4 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note
127, at 216, 216–18; CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 93; LEVY, supra note 61, at 70–71, Trent, supra
note 61, at 454.
197. WOOD, supra note 66, at 367.
198. An Act to Attaint Josiah Phillips and Others, Unless They Render Themselves to
Justice Within a Certain Time, ch. 12, in 9 STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, supra note 68,
at 463–64.
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outlaw.”199 Philips deserved no legal process, Henry argued, because he
had been no Socrates.200
Bills of attainder were most commonly deployed to punish suspected
but unproved Tories.201 Early during the War of Independence, the
State of New York declared that certain named individuals were guilty
of having “voluntarily been adherent” to George III and enacted a bill
of attainder that forever banished them from the state.202 Should they
later be found anywhere in the state, they were “adjudged and declared
guilty of felony” without the benefit of indictment and trial and
sentenced to “death as in cases of felony.”203 New York ultimately
attainted nearly 1,000 people during the revolutionary period.204
Similarly, during those heady days of freedom from colonial rule, the
General Assembly of South Carolina confiscated property from, or
levied fines on, nearly three hundred supposed, but unproved, Tories.205
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia, too, attainted
suspected Tories by the hundreds.206 By the end of the revolutionary
period, each of the newly independent states had enacted bills of
attainder.207
An air of opportunism surrounded the attainder of suspected Tories;
in some cases the states confiscated Tory property for their own use,208
199. Convention of Virginia, supra note 135, at 140. Thomas Jefferson himself was
responsible for writing the bill attainting Philips and shepherding it through the Virginia
Assembly. LEVY, supra note 61, at 72.
200. Convention of Virginia, supra note 135, at 140.
201. LEVY, supra note 61, at 71–72.
202. An Act for the Forfeiture and Sale of the Estates of Persons Who Have Adhered
to the Enemies of this State, and for Declaring the Sovereignty of the People of this State, in
Respect to all Property Within the Same, ch. 25 (1779), in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 26, 26–27 (Thomas Greenleaf ed., New York, 1792).
203. Id. at 27.
204. LEVY, supra note 61, at 71.
205. WOOD, supra note 66, at 279.
206. E.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800); Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1
Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788); Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 5–6 (1782); see also LEVY,
supra note 61, at 71.
207. CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 72.
208. E.g., An Act to Compel Non-Residents to Return Within a Certain Time or in
Default Thereof, That Their Estates Be Confiscated, and for Confiscating the Estate of
William Knox, Esq. Formerly Provost Marshal, of the Then Province, Now State of Georgia
(1778), in 19 (pt. 2) THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 127,
at 126, 126–27; An Act to Confiscate the Estates of Sundry Persons Therein Named, ch. 19
(1778), in 4 LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, supra note 127, at 191, 191–93; An Act to Confiscate
the Estates of Certain Notorious Conspirators Against the Government and Liberties of the
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and in others, they confiscated property in order to transfer it to another
private party.209 Serving the dual interests of protecting Whigs from
economic competition and preventing Tories from receiving fair legal
representation, New Jersey and Pennsylvania barred Tory lawyers from
practicing in their courts.210 In what may only be viewed as equally
unfair play, the loyalist wing of some state legislatures attainted leaders
of the rebellion during this period as well.211
The revolutionary generation was well aware, too, of the long history
of special detriment legislation enacted in Great Britain leading up to
and during the colonial period. In the century leading up to the
American Revolution, bills of attainder and bills of pains and penalties
were common in England.212 As in America, British special laws were
often directed at political undesirables and accompanied by forfeiture of
property.213 One well-known example was the attainder of Thomas
Wentworth, the Earl of Strafford. Like the subsequent attainder of
Philips in Virginia, Strafford was attainted as an expedient to obviate
the normal legal processes.214 An adviser to Charles I, Strafford fell out
of favor with Parliament because of his influence over the King.
Parliament charged him with treason and began his trial before the
House of Lords; during the trial, it became evident that Strafford had
Inhabitants of the Late Province, Now State, of Massachusetts Bay, ch. 48 (1778), in 5 ACTS
RESOLVES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY, supra note 127, at 966–67. In many cases,
the confiscations were directed at Tories, who also saw their ability to practice their
professions curtailed by opportunistic Whig legislatures. LEVY, supra note 61, at 71; BAILYN,
supra note 61, at 302; Trent, supra note 61, at 454.
209. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 39–40.
210. LEVY, supra note 61, at 71.
211. E.g., An Act to Attaint of High Treason the Several Persons Herein After Named
if They Do Not Render Themselves to Justice by a Certain Day and for Other Purposes
Therein Mentioned (1781), in 1 THE REVOLUTIONARY RECORDS OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA 364, 364–70 (Allen D. Candler ed., Atlanta, Franklin-Turner Co. 1908).
212. E.g., An Act for the Attainder of the Pretended Prince of Wales of High Treason,
1701, 13 & 14 Will. 3, c. 3, in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM 739 (John Raithby ed., London,
1820); An Act to Attaint Such of the Persons Concerned in the Late Horrid Conspiracy to
Assassinate His Majesties Royal Person Who Are Fled from Justice Unless They Render
Themselves to Justice and for Continuing Several Others of the Said Conspirators in Custody,
1696–1697, 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 5, in 7 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra, at 165; An Act for
Attainting Thomas Dolman Joseph Bampfield and Thomas Scott of High-Treason if They
Render Not Themselves by a Day, 1665, 17 Car. 2, c. 5, in 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 578
(John Raithby ed., London, 1819); LEVY, supra note 61, at 69–70; Comment, supra note 66, at
330–31.
213. CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 101–17; LEVY, supra note 61, at 68.
214. CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 109–13.
AND
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committed no act that could be called treason. In order to accomplish
by statute what it could not accomplish in a court of law, Parliament
changed course, instead enacting a bill of attainder and sentencing
Strafford to death.215
2. Special Benefit Legislation
Although statutes levying special detriments, like bills of attainder,
are perhaps the best known of the special laws that plagued the new
states, they are far from the only examples. During the revolutionary
period, states passed all manner of special benefit laws, including laws
that provided legal, financial, and political benefits to named individuals
or small, known groups.
Among the most common laws providing special legal benefits were
laws immunizing named individuals from civil suit,216 nullifying
judgments already rendered against them,217 providing immunity from
criminal prosecution, and granting legislative divorces.218 Parties to
lawsuits, too, called on their state legislatures to intercede on their
behalf in private disputes.219 At the behest of litigating parties, state
legislatures enacted measures for the purpose of “setting aside court
decisions, for suspending the general law for the benefit of named
individuals . . . and even for deciding cases.”220 The legislatures, having
usurped the role of the courts,221 unabashedly decided the “personal

215. Id. at 112–13.
216. E.g., Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53, 54 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786).
217. E.g., VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70; see also Lawrie, supra note 129,
at 315.
218. E.g., VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70; Caldwell, 1 Kirby at 54–55.
219. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–21 (1995). The arbitrariness with
which the state legislatures rendered judgment on request from private parties calls to mind
the abuses of the earliest days of the development of the writ system in England. JOHN H.
LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 90 (2009). Although a
party could go to the king to seek justice “more quickly than he could expect from the
ordinary local courts,” the danger in this rough justice was “the utter lack of control.” Id.
Indeed, as a result of the expansion of the arbitrary rendering of decrees, “during many
decades following 1066 abuse was made of this remedy, abuse which would in the course of
time excite a reaction in favor of judicial guarantees.” Id.
220. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, supra note 138, at 70; Plaut, 514 U.S.
at 219–21; PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 40.
221. Madison described the legislature as the “vortex” into which all power of the
government tends to be drawn. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 186, at 309 (James
Madison).
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affairs of their constituents in private law judgments.”222 Rather than
providing extraordinary relief to ensure that justice was done, these
special laws interfered with the “known established laws of the land” for
the benefit of “private interests.”223 Often, the judgments rendered
decided disputes brought by “one individual or group against another”
without regard to the standing laws.224 The case of Mortimer v.
Caldwell225 is illustrative. Caldwell was one of two partners of a recently
bankrupt business. After the bankruptcy, Caldwell obtained a special
law from the state legislature that exempted him from imprisonment for
his inability to pay his debts. Mortimer, a creditor of the bankrupt
business, sued Caldwell to recover money owed to him by the defunct
partnership.226 The court held that Caldwell was immune from suit
because of the special law protecting him.227
Similarly, special laws providing financial benefits were “wide
ranging” during the revolutionary period.228 These special financial
benefits included the transfer of public land and funds to private
individuals229 and the legislative appointment to office.230 Some of the
most controversial pieces of abusive special benefit legislation in the
period leading up to the framing of the Constitution were special laws
that provided monopoly rights to individual natural persons or
corporations. The grant of monopoly rights—state conferred exclusive
privileges to engage in a particular trade231—were resented by
Americans long before they rebelled against Great Britain. Indeed, the

222. WOOD, supra note 66, at 156. Although colonial legislatures, too, decided private
rights, as did Parliament before them, the revolution “intensified legislative domination of the
other parts of the government.” Id. at 155.
223. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 220–21 (quoting Address of the Council of Censors (Feb. 14,
1786), in VERMONT STATE PAPERS 531, 540 (William Slade ed., 1823)).
224. WOOD, supra note 66, at 154–55. Extraordinary legal protections were also
conferred on members of favored groups: as late as 1784, New Hampshire ratified a
constitution that provided for the equal protection under the law for Christians only. N.H.
CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. VI.
225. Mortimer v. Caldwell, 1 Kirby 53 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786).
226. Id. at 53–54.
227. Id. at 55–56.
228. WOOD, supra note 66, at 191.
229. Id.
230. 2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 314–15.
231. Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A
History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 984 (2013).
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practice of legislatively conferring “monopolies was a direct cause of the
American Revolution.”232
In addition to legislation conferring special financial and legal
benefits, the economic and political turmoil during the war years led
some powerful and influential statesmen to advocate laws that would
confer special political benefits.233 At the extreme, “a cabal of the
officers of the army” pushed for Congress to appoint George
Washington to the position of King.234
Others, believing that
republicanism could be restored once the political and economic crises
passed, agitated for the legislature to appoint a temporary Dictator on
the Roman model.235
Given Americans’ recent experiences under British rule, talk of
creating an undemocratic political hierarchy that lodged power in a
small, known group must have seemed no idle threat. Before
independence, royal governors were entitled to reward loyal colonists
with land and pensions.236 Most colonists bristled under this regime of
“special favors and monopolies.”237 They viewed the royal procurement
of loyalty by exercising the “power of patronage and preferment”238 as
akin to the system of personal dependence that plagued the mother
country. They saw not just maladministration but a sinister design in the
elevation of sycophants and flatterers to the detriment of men of virtue
and talent.239 The royal governors offered colonists “opportunities for
profits through the dispensing of government contracts and public
money, thereby buying their support.”240 The people saw the creation of
favored and disfavored citizens, and privileges based on personal
relationships, as the foreshadowing of an English design to create an

232. Id. at 1007–08.
233. LOUISE BURNHAM DUNBAR, A STUDY OF “MONARCHICAL” TENDENCIES IN
THE UNITED STATES FROM 1776 TO 1801, at 80 (Johnson Reprint Corp. 1970).
234. Id. at 40–46 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Fifth Volume of Marshall’s Life
of Washington, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 262, 262 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1898)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
235. Letter from Philip Schuyler to Alexander Hamilton (Sept. 10, 1780), in 2 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 425, 425 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds.,
1961).
236. WOOD, supra note 66, at 78–82.
237. Nourse & Maguire, supra note 19, at 963.
238. WOOD, supra note 66, at 145.
239. BAILYN, supra note 61, at 130; WOOD, supra note 66, at 35, 78–79.
240. WOOD, supra note 66, at 146, 157; BAILYN, supra note 61, at 109.
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American aristocracy.241 And indeed, to the vexation of the colonists, in
the years leading up to the revolution, Parliament seriously considered
establishing an American aristocracy to foster loyalty in the colonies.242
In sum, their experiences during the late colonial and revolutionary
periods, along with well-known British history, provided the framers, as
they met in Philadelphia to draft the Constitution, ample examples of
evils resulting from legislative power to enact special legislation. They
had witnessed populist fervor threaten personal security, property
rights, and political equality. They watched as their legislatures
scapegoated and condemned individuals who were neither formally
accused nor tried for political offenses. They saw special interests take
control of willing representatives and push private agendas through
state legislatures at the expense of the public interest and in derogation
of the very rights for which they purportedly had fought the British.
They saw bills of attainder replicated by the thousands in their seats of
liberty and, perhaps worse, directed at middling merchants rather than
generals and ministers of state. They saw that legal and political
privilege insinuated itself into society, not by force, but rather by
flattery, favors, and self-interest; and this privilege was perpetuated by
enshrining special treatment for adherents of particular political beliefs.
Opportunistic confiscations of property filled state coffers, and barriers
to competition protected the well-connected.
The revolutionary
generation had subjected their courts to oversight by the popular will,
unbounded by logic or reason. It was in this environment that they
realized, perhaps for the first time, that tyranny of the majority was not
only possible but actual; and although they were still in the process of
articulating a workable theory of judicial review,243 they surely
understood by 1787 that limitations on the legislature, to create a space
safe from democracy, were a necessary component of a stable and just
society.244 Indeed, by the time they arrived in Philadelphia to frame the
new national government, they had in mind the object to put an end to
laws that singled out individuals for special treatment,245 including both
special benefit and special detriment legislation.

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

WOOD, supra note 66, at 111–12.
BAILYN, supra note 61, at 278–79; WOOD, supra note 66, at 111–12.
CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 72–77.
WOOD, supra note 66, at 456.
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995); CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 36–37, 62; CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
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B. Revolutionary-Era Americans Affirmed a Commitment to Legislative
Generality.
By the end of the 1780s, the lessons learned from a decade of
freedom had altered the mood of the nation and impressed themselves
on the minds of the framers of the Constitution. Their aversion to
monarchy was tempered by a fear of unrestrained democracy. As James
Wilson succinctly summarized the lessons of the confederation period,
“Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both
proclaim it.”246 Even democratically inclined anti-federalists concluded
that the injustices of the years since independence were borne of an
“excess of democracy” rather than from imperial design.247 Among the
social ills that resulted from the tyranny of the majority, foremost was
special legislation; indeed, the recognition of the evils of special
legislation prompted, in no small part, the convocation of the
Philadelphia Convention.248 It is not surprising, then, that when
debating, drafting, and advocating for the ratification of the
Constitution, the members of the generation that framed the
Constitution affirmatively articulated a value of legislative generality
and roundly rejected special legislation.
1. The Revolutionary Generation Affirmatively Articulated a Value of
Legislative Generality.
James Wilson, among the most influential members of the
Philadelphia Convention, and undoubtedly the most learned in the
history and theory of government,249 articulated a strong theoretical
defense of legislative generality. In his highly regarded Lectures on
Law, Wilson explained that “[l]aw is called a rule, in order to distinguish
it from a . . . particular order.”250 The element of “uniformity,” he

CONSTITUTION, supra note 138, at 148–50; CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT,
supra note 138, at 70–71.
246. 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 254.
247. E.g., id. at 48 (Gerry); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 6, 15, supra note 186, at 106, 145–46
(Alexander Hamilton); see also WOOD, supra note 66, at 513; Keith Werhan, Popular
Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65, 84–85 (2012).
248. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 221; CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138,
at 36–37, 62; CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 138, at
148−50; CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT, supra note 138, at 70–71.
249. See Ewald, supra note 168, at 1002–09.
250. JAMES WILSON, Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation, in LECTURES
ON LAW, PART I, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 464, 468 (Kermit L. Hall &
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argued, is essential to the definition of a law.251 Wilson described
approvingly the ancient Saxon and Roman governments, and the
modern Prussian government, as positive role models of legislative
generality. Perhaps idealizing ancient Saxon governance, Wilson
recalled it as “uniform” in its “laws and liberties.”252 Describing the
“science” of legislation in Rome, Wilson asserted that the object of the
Roman legislative process was to ensure that there was “no regulation,
which might produce a partial advantage” to a law’s sponsor or his
friends or family.253 By contrast, Wilson argued, for any member of
society to be “privileged from the awards of equal justice, is a disgrace,
instead of being an honour.”254 Similarly, Wilson praised the idea, which
he attributed to Frederick of Prussia,255 that “the poorest peasant is a
man, as well as the king himself”; as a result, all are equal under the
law.256 Wilson distinguished generality in law from the privileges that
inhered in the recently rejected British system of government: in
America, unlike in England, the “arcana of privilege, and the arcana of
prerogative, are equally unknown.”257
Wilson’s concept of legislative generality, that all are equally subject
to the laws of society, was a basic premise on which he rested his
defense of the structure of the new government of the United States.
Wilson defended the power of Congress against the charge of despotism
by asserting that the legislature may authorize penalties only “by
general rules, and against all the members of the society
indiscriminately.”258 In other words, the fact that all members in society,
including the legislators themselves, must comply with the laws they
enact, ensures that the legislature will act impartially.259
Wilson’s theoretical defense of legislative generality was reflected in
Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
251. Id. at 464–65.
252. JAMES WILSON, Of the Executive Department, in LECTURES ON LAW, PART II, in
2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 250, at 873, 878.
253. JAMES WILSON, Of the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania—Of
the Legislative Department, in LECTURES ON LAW, PART II, supra note 252, at 829, 864.
254. JAMES WILSON, Of the Nature of Courts, in LECTURES ON LAW, PART II, supra
note 252, at 943, 947.
255. Cf. LOCKE, supra note 163, § 142.
256. WILSON, supra note 254, at 948.
257. WILSON, supra note 253, at 853.
258. JAMES WILSON, The Subject Continued. Of Juries, in LECTURES ON LAW, PART II,
supra note 252, at 954, 960.
259. Id.; see also SIDNEY, supra note 171, at 569–72.
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the much-cited report of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors, which
was charged with assessing the Pennsylvania Assembly’s compliance
with its constitution.260 In language impossible to misunderstand, the
Censors reproached the Assembly for enacting private laws in the years
following independence. The Censors proclaimed that the legislative
power simply did not extend to deciding the rights of individual subjects
in ways that deviated from the “promulgated standing laws.”261 Indeed,
because the very definition of “law” included only “a rule prescribed or
made beforehand,”262 special legislation did not fall within the definition
of the word. The Assembly violated this principle, the Censors wrote,
by “extending their deliberations to the cases of individuals, who have
been taught to consider an application to the legislature, as a shorter
and more certain mode of obtaining relief . . . than the usual process of
law.”263 The Censors reproached the Assembly for enacting laws that
had the effect of “amend[ing] titles to land,” “dissolving . . . the bonds of
marriage,” attainting suspects of “notorious frauds and other enormous
crimes,” granting state benefits to citizens,264 and deciding pending legal
disputes.265
Other prominent Americans, too, reaffirmed the criticisms of special
legislation identified by the Censors. Focusing on one type of special
law identified by the Censors, Hamilton argued that the legislature has
no power to revise court judgments. Reacting to the pervasiveness of
legislative interference in judicial business during the revolutionary era,
Hamilton asserted that the “legislature, without exceeding its province,
cannot reverse a determination once made in a particular case.”266 And
in rare agreement with Hamilton, Jefferson criticized the newly
independent Virginia legislature for “decid[ing] rights which should

260. The Pennsylvania Report was described at length in The Federalist No. 48 by
Madison. Madison relied on the Report’s finding that “cases belonging to the judiciary
department [are] frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and determination” as
evidence of legislative abuse of power. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 186, at 311–12
(James Madison).
261. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 37 (quoting LOCKE, supra note 163,
§ 136).
262. Id. at 38.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 41, 46–48, 57, 59.
265. Id. at 40.
266. THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 186, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton); CORWIN,
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 138, at 46.
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have been left to judiciary controversy.”267 These notable statements
reflect the broader awareness overtaking the revolutionary generation
that the legislature simply did not have the power “to suspend,
supercede, or render void by extemporary decrees . . . established
standing laws,” even if these special laws were enacted in accordance
with formal lawmaking requirements.268
2. The Revolutionary Generation Rejected Special Benefit Legislation.
After suffering through years of state grants of special privileges, by
the end of the confederation period Americans were becoming
convinced that “none were entitled to any rights, but such as were
common to all.”269 Granting “peculiar privileges” either to individuals
or to “any body of men” was considered “repugnant to the spirit of the
American republics.”270 As a result, popular sentiment rejected the
power assumed by state legislatures during the revolutionary era to
bestow special benefits. Among the special benefit laws criticized by the
revolutionary generation, three types stand out: first, special laws
granting exclusive legal and financial privileges; second, special laws
appointing officers to positions of public trust; and third, special laws
recognizing and confirming the elevation of some members of society
over others.
First, the highly influential Vermont Council of Censors, which, like
its analog in Pennsylvania, catalogued its legislature’s violations of its
constitution, sharply criticized the Vermont legislature for granting
special legal privileges during the revolutionary period. Among other
abuses, the Censors chided the legislature for granting divorces to
named parties and declaring them eligible to remarry, granting named
individuals immunity from civil suit or nullifying judgments already

267. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Query XIII, in NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 176, 196
(London, John Stockdale 1787); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219–24
(1995); THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 186, at 311 (James Madison).
268. WOOD, supra note 66, at 404–05 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Letter from a
Gentleman in the Country, to His Friend in This Town, INDEP. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL
ADVERTISER, Jan. 29. 1778, at 1); BAILYN, supra note 61, at 68–69.
269. WOOD, supra note 66, at 214 (quoting 2 DAVID RAMSAY, HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 168 (1816)) (internal quotation marks omitted); VERMONT REPORT, supra
note 72, at 61.
270. WOOD, supra note 66, at 401 (quoting PENNSYLVANIA DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 136, at 77) (internal quotation mark omitted); 12 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 137, at 155–56.
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rendered against them, and even conferring criminal immunity on two
individuals responsible for leading a riot.271 The Censors expressed
bewilderment at the presumptuousness of the legislature’s decision to
grant special exemptions from the standing laws. The Censors asked,
rhetorically, why a named individual “should be made an exception to
the general rule” and “whence the authority was derived, that, in this
instance, altered or dispensed with the operation of the law.”272 With
equal fervor, the Pennsylvania Censors denounced the Pennsylvania
Assembly for awarding public benefits to individuals on any basis other
than a neutral assessment of services rendered to the commonwealth.273
Similarly, as the state constitutional delegations considered the
ratification of the Constitution, members reiterated the conviction that
the legislature was not permitted to grant exclusive legal or financial
privileges to individuals.
In the Virginia Ratifying Convention,
delegates expressed concern that the new Constitution might be read to
permit a European-style economic regime, in which favored merchants
were given exclusive privileges at the expense of others.274 They
opposed any reading of the Constitution that allowed Congress to grant
these “exclusive privileges and immunities” either on federal lands or in
the states.275
A focal point of concern was the practice of granting exclusive rights
to certain, named individuals to engage in a particular trade—a practice
known as granting a monopoly.276 Common in Britain during the
sixteenth century, this practice famously was criticized by Lord Coke in
the Case of Monopolies, in which Coke opined that monopolies were
opposed to the common law and against the Magna Charta.277 Because
the American colonies were settled when Coke was most influential in
England, his opinions, including his opinion that monopolies were
unlawful, maintained longevity long after his fame declined in Britain

271. VERMONT REPORT, supra note 72, at 60–70.
272. Id. at 61.
273. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 38.
274. Convention of Virginia, supra note 135, at 291, 431.
275. Id.
276. Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 231, at 1007–08.
277. Case of Monopolies, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.) 1262–63; 11 Co. Rep. 84b,
85b–86a; Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna
Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 604–08
(2009).
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itself.278 In line with, and perhaps because of, Coke’s opinion in the Case
of Monopolies, the confederation period saw popular sentiment reject
the power of the legislature “to give monopolies of legal privilege—to
bestow unequal portions of our common inheritance on favourites.”279
The granting of monopolies, along with other “unequal or partial
distribution of public benefits,” was attacked as tantamount to the
“establishment of an aristocracy.”280
Writers bemoaned the
compromised ideals of the new nation, which had been “sacrificed
constantly to local views” and “lost in the scramble for private
advantages and local favors.”281 No doubt it was this sentiment that led
the people of Massachusetts to adopt a broad prohibition on special
benefits in its Constitution of 1780. Authored by John Adams, the
Massachusetts Constitution provided that “[n]o man, nor corporation,
or association of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or
particular and exclusive privileges, distinct from those of the
community, than what arises from the consideration of services
rendered to the public.”282 Expressing the same sentiment, the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776 declared that “no man, or set of men, are
entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the
community, but in consideration of public services.”283
Second, the revolutionary generation rejected the power of the
legislature to appoint officers to positions of public trust. During the
colonial period, the doling out of offices was the hated prerogative of
the Crown.284 However, once the colonies became independent states
dominated by their legislative branches, the appointment of favorites to
offices of trust became the hallmark of the state legislatures. The
reaction was predictable: after the experience of the 1780s, Federalists
argued credibly that the real danger to liberty came not from an
278. Gedicks, supra note 277, at 614; see also CORWIN, DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW, supra note 138, at 28–29; WOOD, supra note 66, at 264.
279. WOOD, supra note 66, at 402 (quoting PENNSYLVANIA DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 136, at 130) (internal quotation marks omitted); Smith, supra note
139, at 304–05 (noting that Coke believed that all monopolies were rendered unlawful by the
Magna Charta).
280. WOOD, supra note 66, at 401 (quoting Strictures on the Bank, and on a Paper
Currency, PA. PACKET, Mar. 31, 1785, at 3).
281. Id. at 501 (quoting 1 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 552) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
282. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. VI.
283. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 4.
284. WOOD, supra note 66, at 111–12.
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aristocracy, but from the ability of the legislature to hand out
appointments to those eager to wrest private gain from the public fisc.285
By the time of the ratification of the Constitution, the corruption caused
by legislative appointments was widely acknowledged.286 In the
Philadelphia Convention, the state legislatures’ abuse of the
appointments process was cited as “proof” that the “Legislature was an
improper body for appointments.”287 Wilson affirmed that “he had
always thought the appointment of the Executives by the Legislative
department wrong.”288 Madison articulated the theoretical defense of
divesting the legislature of its historical power of appointment of
officers: only by denying the legislature the power to appoint officers
would those officers execute their positions free from the corruption
that comes from dependence on the legislative branch.289 Wilson
responded that the “proper cure . . . for corruption in the Legislature
was to take from it the power of appointing to offices.”290
Third, the American rejection of special benefit laws was intimately
connected with their perception that special privileges were the first step
toward establishing a hereditary aristocracy.291 As a result, throughout
the ratification process, the revolutionary generation asserted that the
legislature had no power to create special legal privileges for itself that
distinguished it from the population at large. John Adams, an early
critic of unchecked legislative power, viewed special legislation as the
method by which the legislature established itself as an aristocracy.292
Anticipating Wilson’s later defense of the United States Constitution,
Adams argued that an unchecked legislature will make “one little
distinction after another” between its own prerogatives and the rights of
the common people.293 An “unchecked” assembly, argued Adams,
285. Id. at 551.
286. Id. at 145.
287. 2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 314–15.
288. Id. at 231.
289. Id. at 34.
290. 1 id. at 387.
291. References to the prevention or elimination of an American aristocracy abound
during the revolutionary era. See, e.g., id. at 83, 402–03, 474, 544–45; 2 id. at 207, 530; The
Debates in the Convention of the State of New York on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution [hereinafter Convention of New York], in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 138,
at 205, 277.
292. 1 JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 379–81 (London, John Stockdale 1794).
293. Id. at 379.
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would “exempt itself from the burdens it laid on its constituents, and
pass and execute laws for its own benefit.”294 Although the special
privileges will start small, each inequality introduced by the legislature
will lead to greater usurpations, eventually allowing the state legislatures
to subvert democracy entirely.295 Similarly, in the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, George Nicholas argued that the proposed Constitution
permitted the legislature to “pass no law but what will equally affect
their own persons, their families, and property.”296
The revolutionary era’s distrust of laws that smacked of aristocracy
is best exemplified by the popular reaction to the Society of the
Cincinnati, a fraternal order established by former Revolutionary War
officers.297
Membership in the Society was limited to former
Continental Army officers and their descendants; other than honorary
members, no one could ever be a member of the Society except the
officer himself and either his “eldest son or other heir at law.”298
Reaction to the establishment of the Society was swift and ferocious.299
Americans saw the creation of the Cincinnati as an attempt by the
officers to establish a “hereditary Military Nobility.”300 Despite the fact
that the organization was private in nature, and not sanctioned by the
state, Americans were so sensitive even to the specter of the
establishment of an American aristocracy that they insisted that the
Society was “against the Confederation; against the letter of some of our
constitutions; against the spirit of them all.”301 Overwhelming popular
opposition to the Cincinnati led the well-respected Washington to
demand that the Society eliminate the hereditary character of the
organization’s membership.302
294. BAILYN, supra note 61, at 288–89.
295. 1 ADAMS, supra note 292, at 379–81.
296. Convention of Virginia, supra note 135, 18.
297. WOOD, supra note 66, at 399–400.
298. Larson, supra note 122, at 1387–88.
299. WOOD, supra note 66, at 399–400.
300. Id. at 400 (quoting Letter from Samuel Adams to Elbridge Gerry (Apr. 23, 1784),
in 4 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS, 1778–1802, at 300, 301 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed.,
1908)).
301. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1784), in 7 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 105, 106 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1953); Larson, supra
note 122, at 1388–89, 1393; see VA. CONST. of 1776, § 4.
302. Larson, supra note 122, at 1397–99. As Professor Larson explains, although the
Cincinnati failed to rescind formally the hereditary character of the Society because the
proposed amendment was not ratified by the necessary number of State chapters, opposition
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The strong opposition to privileges established by law did not end
with the dustup over the Cincinnati; the delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention agreed, without dissent, to prohibit both the states and the
federal government from granting any titles of nobility.303 Through the
addition of the Appointments Clause, they also affirmed that Congress
could not itself exercise the power of appointment that was so abused by
the state legislatures during the confederation period.304 In New York’s
Constitutional Convention, a motion was made to explicitly prevent
Congress from having the power “to grant monopolies, or erect any
company with exclusive advantages of commerce.”305 And the newly
constituted House of Representatives took the restriction on titles of
nobility so seriously, if not literally, that it “formally & unanimously
condemned” a suggestion to address President Washington as
“Excellency” or even “Esquire.”306 Madison, although incredulous that
merely ascribing a European-style title to the new President would
precipitate an end to republicanism, agreed that titles “are not very
reconcilable with the nature of our government, or the genius of the
people”;307 this sentiment was widely shared by the end of the 1780s.308
3. The Revolutionary Generation Rejected Special Detriment
Legislation.
The generation of the framing of the Constitution denounced special
detriment legislation with equal vigor. In recalling the attainder of
Philips, Edmund Randolph called it “shocking,” declaring that he would
sooner abandon his beloved home rather than see Virginia permit a
repetition of such an “arbitrary deprivation of life.”309 Speaking of New
York’s attainder of Loyalists during the revolution, John Jay stated that
“New York is disgraced by injustice too palpable to admit even of
palliation.”310 In sharp contrast with the zeal with which state

faded away after Washington denounced the hereditary component and the general meeting
of the Society proposed eliminating the hereditary element. Id.
303. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 177, 183.
304. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
305. Convention of New York, supra note 291, at 407.
306. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 9, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 137, at 142, 143.
307. Title for the President, supra note 137, at 155.
308. DUNBAR, supra note 233, at 80–81.
309. Convention of Virginia, supra note 135, at 66–67.
310. CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 93.
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legislatures attainted suspected Tories during the revolution, the
members of the Philadelphia Convention accepted the addition of the
Bill of Attainder Clauses without debate.311 Indeed, by the time of the
ratification of the federal Constitution, several states already had
banned bills of attainder.312
So, too, did the revolutionary generation come to regret the
confiscations of property that were so rampant during the confederation
period. Citing Blackstone, Hamilton wrote that the confiscation of
property by the legislature is a “gross and notorious . . . act of
despotism,” tantamount to tyranny.313 The Pennsylvania Censors
reflected the mood of the waning confederation years when it
denounced its legislature for confiscating property of the
Commonwealth’s inhabitants.314 Not surprisingly, by the time of the
ratification of the Constitution, a number of states specifically protected
property in their Constitutions from confiscation without judicial
process.315
Putting this widespread sentiment into theoretical terms, Wilson
explained why the legislature lacks the power to enact laws that strip
privileges from individually identified people. As opposed to generally
applicable laws, which may “be safely trusted to the representatives of
the community,” laws that purport to act on individuals must be
restrained in order to avoid injustice.316 If a corporate charter, public
contract, or a citizen’s naturalization may be repealed by legislative act,
Wilson argued, the legislature will manufacture any pretense, however
specious, to harm individuals or known groups that run afoul of the
majority will.317 In other words, because the majority is bound by a
generally applicable law, majoritarianism ensures that generally
applicable laws will be just. By contrast, because the majority can agree
to single out a single person for negative treatment, special laws are

311. 2 FARRAND, supra note 1, at 375–76; CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 95.
312. CHAFEE, supra note 66, at 94–95; WOOD, supra note 66, at 436–37.
313. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 186, at 474–75 (Alexander Hamilton)
(quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 145, at 101).
314. PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 132, at 39–40.
315. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. X; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XII; PA.
CONST. of 1776, art. VIII; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. IX; VA. CONST. of 1776, § 6.
316. JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Bank of North America 1785, in
1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 250, at 60, 71.
317. Id. at 71–72.
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prohibited because majoritarianism does not restrain the evils of special
legislation.
In sum, the history of the period leading up to the framing of the
Constitution demonstrates that special legislation was a primary concern
facing the revolutionary generation.
In the early years after
independence, populist state legislatures levied all manner of injustices
through special legislation. They enacted bills of attainder, confiscated
property, reversed court judgments, revoked corporate charters, and
threatened to undermine republicanism in the new states by special
grants of prerogative and privilege. After a long decade of these abuses,
both common and prominent members of the revolutionary generation
reaffirmed a commitment to legislative generality and rejected the
power of the legislature to enact special laws. They rejected both
special benefit and special detriment legislation, articulated a theoretical
defense of legislative generality based on their inherited philosophical
tradition, and began to enshrine protections against abusive special
legislation in their state constitutions. It was with these shared
experiences that the framers gathered in Philadelphia to frame a
government.
C. Post-Ratification History’s Challenge to the Value of Legislative
Generality
As described above, special legislation was a significant source of
suffering during the confederation period; and the revolutionary
generation, including many of the Constitution’s framers, vehemently
criticized special legislation as the revolutionary era drew to a close. As
a result, it would be only reasonable to suppose that Congress and state
legislatures ceased enacting special legislation after the ratification of
the Constitution. This was not the case; indeed, legislatures continued
to enact special legislation after the ratification of the Constitution,
presenting a challenge to the conclusion that the history of the framing
period supports a value of legislative generality. The objection based on
post-ratification history can be stated as follows: the fact that state
legislatures and Congress enacted special legislation after the
ratification of the Constitution suggests that, however real were the
revolutionary generation’s concerns about special legislation, these
concerns were not manifested in an enforceable constitutional value.
Although this is a serious objection calling for an exploration of
post-ratification history, an examination of the period following
ratification supports the conclusion that the value of legislative
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generality persisted after the ratification of the Constitution. First, an
examination of the special laws enacted by Congress immediately after
ratification suggests that its members disapproved of the types of special
legislation enacted by the revolutionary-era legislatures. Second, an
examination of the special laws that were proposed and rejected during
the first years after ratification suggests that special legislation was still
disfavored after ratification. Third, doctrinal history suggests that the
early Supreme Court enforced the value of legislative generality. Taken
together, this post-ratification history supports the conclusion that the
value of legislative generality articulated by the framing generation
survived the ratification of the Constitution.
1. The Special Laws Enacted By the First Congress Do Not Evince an
Acceptance of Special Legislation.
Congress and state legislatures continued to enact special laws after
the Constitution’s ratification. Indeed, several private bills were
enacted by the first Congress;318 state legislatures increasingly enacted
private laws in the years after ratification, enacting more private laws
than public laws until well into the nineteenth century.319 This evidence
could suggest that the revolutionary generation’s concerns about special
legislation were not enshrined in a right enforceable under the new
Constitution.320
However, a close examination of the special laws enacted by the first
Congress does not lead to the conclusion that the framers accepted the
constitutionality of special legislation in general. First, the special laws
enacted by the first Congress were, for lack of a better word, special.
The vast majority, and perhaps all, of these special laws arose out of
claims against the United States precipitated by the recently concluded
war for independence.321 The first Congress’s special laws guaranteeing

318. E.g., Act of June 4, 1790, ch. 16, 6 Stat. 2 (“adjusting and satisfying the claims of
Frederick William de Steuben”); Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 26, 6 Stat. 1 (allowing “the Baron
de Glaubeck the pay of a Captain in the Army of the United States”).
319. Ireland, supra note 18, at 271–73.
320. Pfander & Wardon, supra note 99, at 399.
321. William C. diGiacomantonio, Petitioners and Their Grievances: A View from the
First Federal Congress, in THE HOUSE AND SENATE IN THE 1790S: PETITIONING, LOBBYING,
AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 29, 49, 53–54 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R.
Kennon eds., 2002); see, e.g., Act of Aug. 11, 1790, ch. 45, 6 Stat. 4 (providing relief for “the
persons therein mentioned or described”); Act of Aug. 11, 1790, ch. 44, 6 Stat. 3 (providing
relief to “disabled soldiers and seamen lately in the service of the United States, and certain
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pensions for the wounded,322 benefits for the widowed323 and
orphaned,324 and reimbursement for those whose property was
commandeered during the war325 are best seen as “cleanup” laws
designed to settle the accounts of the United States for debts incurred
during the confederation period before Congress came into existence.
Congress paid these claims not as a gratuity but “only when it felt
contractually bound to do so.”326
Second, many of the laws enacted by the first Congress that named
individuals were “special” neither within the strict definition nor spirit
of the word because they did not single out the individuals named in the
laws for special treatment. By contrast, these laws were generalizing;
that is, they ensured that the named individuals would be treated the
same as others similarly situated.327 For example, the first Congress
granted death benefits to the widow and orphan, respectively, of two
men killed in battle.328 In this same law, however, Congress also
provided that “the widow or orphan of each officer, non-commissioned
officer, or soldier, who was killed or died whilst in the service of the
United States” was entitled to a pension.329 Similarly, a private law
granting a pension to a particular foreign officer who served in the
United States army during the Revolutionary War provided that he was
to be paid “in the same manner as other foreign officers in the service of
the United States” had been paid.330
Third, early special laws, while on their terms providing special
benefits, often were enacted as precursors to generally applicable laws
that would be enacted at a later time. For example, the first Congress
provided for the payment of pensions for certain disabled soldiers by

other persons”); ch. 16, 6 Stat. 2; ch. 26, 6 Stat. 1.
322. Ch. 44, 6 Stat. 3.
323. Act of Feb. 27, 1793, ch. 14, 6 Stat. 12 (“making provision for the persons therein
mentioned”); ch. 45, 6 Stat. 4.
324. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 28, 6 Stat. 12 (“providing an annual allowance for the
education of Hugh Mercer”); ch. 14, 6 Stat. 12; ch. 45, § 2, 6 Stat. at 5.
325. Act of Apr. 13, 1792, ch. 21, 6 Stat. 8 (compensating “the corporation of trustees of
the public grammar school and academy of Wilmington, in the state of Delaware, for the
occupation of, and damages to, the said school during the war”).
326. DiGiacomantonio, supra note 321, at 49.
327. Ch. 45, § 4, 6 Stat. at 5; ch. 44, § 5, 6 Stat. at 4.
328. Ch. 45, §§ 1–2, 4, 6 Stat. at 4–5.
329. Id. § 4, 6 Stat. at 5.
330. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 26, 6 Stat. 1.
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name.331 However, in this same statute, Congress provided that the
pensions for the named soldiers “shall be paid, according to such laws as
. . . shall be made relative to invalid pensioners” and that back pay for
pension arrears should be paid “in such manner as Congress may
hereafter provide.”332
In sum, the special laws enacted by the first Congress were, in a
sense, sui generis: they reimbursed individuals who had valid legal
claims that arose before the existence of Congress; they ensured that
similarly situated individuals would be treated alike rather than
differently; and they established that the named individuals would be
included in the class of people who would benefit from generally
applicable rules once general laws were enacted by Congress. They bear
little resemblance to the special laws enacted by the states and criticized
by the revolutionary generation prior to the ratification of the
Constitution. As a result, no fair reading of these laws can serve as
evidence that special laws were accepted without qualification by the
revolutionary generation.
2. The First Congress Failed to Enact a Wide Variety of Special Laws.
In addition to examining laws that were enacted by the first
Congress, it is also instructive to examine the types of laws that were not
enacted during this period. Although Congressional silence is not
always good evidence of intent, silence is perhaps more probative when
compared with the track record of legislation in the years leading up to
the ratification. It is true that the first Congress enacted the arguably
special laws described above; however it must be recalled that the first
Congress did not enact most of the types of special laws so criticized by
the founding generation. As noted above, before the ratification of the
Constitution, state legislatures enacted countless bills of attainder, laws
confiscating property, laws immunizing named individuals from civil suit
and nullifying judgments already rendered against them, and laws
providing immunity from criminal prosecution, as well as laws granting
special financial benefits and exemptions from generally applicable
laws.333 No law like these, which were so harshly criticized by the
framing generation, was enacted by the first Congress. Moreover, the

331. Ch. 44, § 1, 6 Stat. at 3.
332. Id. § 5, 6 Stat. at 4.
333. See supra part V.A.
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first Congress ignored most of the private petitions presented to it
because the petitions did not reflect previously existing legal
obligations.334 The first Congress also declined to pass a number of bills
aimed at providing funding for particular projects with merely local
effect.335 The sharp curtailing of special laws, which abounded just a few
years earlier, strongly suggests that the first Congress recognized that
these types of special laws were no longer acceptable after the
ratification of the Constitution.336
3. The Early Court Recognized a Value of Legislative Generality.
Just as the explosion of special laws in the mid-nineteenth century
obscures their marked decrease immediately after the ratification of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court’s modern indifference toward special
legislation belies the early Court’s dim view of its constitutionality.
Indeed, in many of its best-known decisions—including the Dartmouth
College Case, Fletcher v. Peck, and McCulloch v. Maryland—the early
Supreme Court invalidated special legislation. Although these cases are
known for their expansive interpretation of the powers of the new
federal government, a fair reading of these cases must take note of the
way that they criticize, and ultimately invalidate, special legislation.
This view of early post-ratification doctrinal history suggests that the
value of legislative generality, although now all but ignored by the
Court, once was an enforced value.
In the Dartmouth College Case, the legislature of the State of New
Hampshire intervened in a dispute between the president and trustees
of Dartmouth College. After the trustees deposed Dartmouth’s
president, the legislature transferred the assets of the College to the

334. DiGiacomantonio, supra note 321, at 53–54.
335. Id.
336. For reasons of space, a comprehensive review of state legislation after ratification
is beyond the scope of this article. However, an initial inquiry reveals that the states enacted
far fewer special laws in the years following the ratification of the Constitution. In Delaware,
special laws decreased by approximately 25% from the two-year period before ratification to
the two-year period after ratification. See, e.g., THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, IN
TWO VOLUMES (New Castle, Samuel Adams & John Adams 1798). Moreover, although
Delaware’s pre-ratification special laws included the types of laws criticized by the
revolutionary generation—including laws that named individuals to government positions,
disallowed named individuals from a generally applicable amnesty, and granted public wealth
to private individuals—in the years immediately following ratification, Delaware’s special
laws were limited to incorporating business associations and permitting the reformation of
wills. Id.
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newly created Dartmouth University.337 Daniel Webster, on behalf of
the College, argued that the legislature’s attempt to single out a
particular corporation and give its property to another was
unconstitutional because “these acts are not the exercise of a power
properly legislative.”338 Webster argued that “acts of the legislature,
which affect only particular persons and their particular privileges” are
not, properly speaking, laws.339 In his opinion, Justice Story agreed with
Webster that New Hampshire’s statute was defective because it was
special, as opposed to general, legislation. Story distinguished New
Hampshire’s statute from a general law that permitted individuals to
divorce, arguably breaking their marriage contract. Story held that
“general laws regulating divorces” certainly were not prohibited by the
Contract Clause.340 By contrast, the dissolution of a particular marriage,
like New Hampshire’s special statute, “entrench[ed] upon the
prohibition of the constitution.”341 A corollary to this rule, wrote Story,
is that the legislature may not “lawfully take the property of A. and give
it to B.”342 In light of this distinction, Story rejected the power of the
New Hampshire legislature to transfer the property of Dartmouth
College to the newly created Dartmouth University.343
The distinction in Dartmouth College between general and special
laws reaffirmed the principle that the Court previously made explicit in
Fletcher v. Peck. In Fletcher, the legislature of the State of Georgia
enacted a statute authorizing the governor to sell state-owned land.344
When it came to light that the original sale of land may have been
tainted by bribery, a newly elected legislature enacted a statute
purporting to nullify the previous act.345 Peck’s counsel argued that the
power to declare legislation authorizing the sale of land void was not a
legislative power: “It is the province of the judiciary to say what the law
is, or what it was. The legislature can only say what it shall be.”346 Chief
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, adopted this limitation on the
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 546–47 (1819).
Id. at 558.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 696 (opinion of Story, J.).
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 712.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
Id. at 90.
Id. at 123.
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power of the legislature and restated it forcefully. Marshall conceded
that “[t]o the legislature all legislative power is granted”; but this truism,
Marshall wrote, did not resolve the question of the scope of legislative
power.347 The real question is whether an act nullifying the power to
transfer a particular parcel of land is even a legislative act. Marshall
answered in the negative: “It is the peculiar province of the legislature
to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application
of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of
other departments.”348 Because the Georgia legislature’s second statute
was not a general rule for the government of society, it simply was
outside the scope of the legislative authority.349
The principle articulated in Fletcher and Dartmouth is evident in the
results of other Marshall Court cases as well. In McCulloch, the Court
struck down a tax imposed by the legislature of Maryland that was
“levelled exclusively at the branch of the United States’ Bank
established in Maryland.”350 In striking down the tax, the Court
emphasized that its unconstitutionality was linked to its special nature.
The Court held that Maryland’s tax would not have been
unconstitutional if it were confined to taxing “the real property of the
bank, in common with the other real property within the State.”351 In
other words, the fact that the tax was levied on a single institution drove
the conclusion that it was unconstitutional; by contrast, a tax levied
generally would not be unconstitutional.352
Read together, these early Court opinions suggest that special laws
enacted after the ratification of the Constitution were disfavored

347. Id. at 136.
348. Id. (emphasis added).
349. Id. Moreover, the clause of the Constitution prohibiting bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts also restricts the power of the state
legislature to nullify a previously enacted statute.
350. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 392 (1819).
351. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
352. Similarly, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the Court struck down
a New York state law that granted two individuals the exclusive right to use steam navigation
on all of the waters of New York for thirty years. 22 U.S. at 6–7. Meanwhile, an act of
Congress provided a generally applicable law for licensing and regulating ships. Id. at 28.
Although the Court did not address the question of special legislation directly, in striking
down the state law granting the special privilege, it did note that federal law, unlike the state
statute, provided a method of licensing that “applies to every vessel.” Id. at 220. In so noting,
the Gibbons Court suggests that its decision took into account the fact that it was striking
down a special law in favor of a general one.
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because of their particularized nature. Although these Marshall Court
cases are remembered for their expansive reading of federal power,
reading them closely reveals that the special nature of the laws at issue
was an integral part of the Court’s decision to strike them down.
Reading these Marshall Court cases as consistently disfavoring
special legislation also helps make sense of the Court’s earlier Calder v.
Bull353 decision. In Calder, the Court upheld the right of Connecticut’s
lawmaking body, the General Court, to vacate a lower court judgment
and grant a new trial to the losing party. As each of the Justices took
great pains to clarify, the action of the General Court did not trigger the
restrictions of the Ex Post Facto Clause because the grant of a new trial
was not a law. Each of the Justices writing opinions noted that, at the
time Calder was decided, Connecticut’s General Court sat both as a
legislature and as a court of appeal, much like the English House of
Lords.354 Each Justice opined that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not
reach the General Court’s grant of a new trial because the General
Court was acting in its judicial capacity rather than in its legislative
capacity; in other words, the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply because
the General Court simply had not enacted a law.355 Although the
Court’s distinction between the judicial and legislative functions of the
General Court may seem strained, it makes perfect sense in light of a
preexisting value of legislative generality. If the order granting a new
trial was considered to be a legislative act, it would have been a special
law. As a result, in light of the value of legislative generality, the only
way the Court could affirm the act of the General Court was to find that
the action of the General Court was not a law at all, which is precisely
what the Court did. In the absence of a value of legislative generality, it
would have been possible, and far simpler, for the Court to rest on its
alternative ground that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to
criminal laws. The Court’s insistence that the grant of a new trial was
not a law makes sense only in light of the constraint imposed by the
value of legislative generality.
In sum, the history of the revolutionary period strongly suggests the
existence of a value of legislative generality at the time of the
ratification of the Constitution. Although the post-ratification history is

353. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
354. Id. at 395 (opinion of Paterson, J.).
355. Id. at 387–88 (opinion of Chase, J.); id. at 400–01 (opinion of Cushing, J.).
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decidedly more mixed,356 it does not vitiate the basic lessons of the
revolutionary period. A fair reading of the post-ratification history
indicates that the first Congress did not sanguinely continue the states’
pre-Constitution practice of enacting special legislation without
restraint. Rather, the worst types of special laws ceased immediately
after ratification. Special laws enacted after ratification included, by
contrast, “clean-up” legislation designed to settle the accounts of the
Congress from the confederation period and legislative precedents for
future general laws on similar subjects, such as pensions. The Supreme
Court’s early cases strongly suggest that special legislation continued to
be disfavored after ratification of the Constitution, at least during the
republic’s first decades. For these reasons, even considering the postratification history of special laws, the history of the revolutionary
period indicates strong support for the value of legislative generality.
VI. THE CONTOURS OF THE VALUE OF LEGISLATIVE GENERALITY
AND THE IMPACT OF ITS REVIVAL
The precise contours of the value of legislative generality, and a
comprehensive evaluation of the impact of its enforcement, must wait

356. The existence of special legislation after ratification is in some tension with the
strongly articulated pre-ratification value of legislative generality. However, pre-ratification
history is more probative of the intention of the framers at the time of ratification than is
post-ratification history. First, post-ratification legislation reflects political decisions, not
constitutional interpretation. Once the Constitution was ratified, the framers who served in
Congress became politicians, subject to the same pressure to serve their constituents that
always has characterized electoral politics. 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 338 (1953). As a member of
the House of Representatives, Madison urged interpretations of the Constitution that were
entirely at odds with positions he took in the Virginia Constitutional Convention. Id.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Madison later remarked that “legislative precedents are . . . entitled
to little respect” when interpreting the Constitution. Letter from James Madison to Judge
Spencer Roane (May 6, 1821), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES
317 (David B. Mattern, J.C.A. Stagg & Mary Parke Johnson eds., 2013); Letter from James
Madison to James Monroe (Dec. 27, 1817), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON:
RETIREMENT SERIES 190, 191 (David B. Mattern et al., 2009). Second, the framers were a
relatively small part of, and were only sporadically influential on, the decisions of the first
Congress. Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of
History, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1745, 1767–68 (2006). For these reasons, perhaps, the Supreme
Court’s reliance on post-ratification history to interpret the Constitution has been mixed. As
the Court recently reiterated, “post-enactment” history is a “contradiction in terms”; it is “not
a legitimate tool” of interpretation because statements made after a provision is enacted have
no bearing on the intention of those enacting that provision. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131
S. Ct. 1068, 1081–82 (2011).

688

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:625

until after an articulation of the value’s textual and philosophical
underpinnings. Nevertheless, the foregoing historical evidence allows us
to draw some preliminary conclusions with a fair degree of confidence.
First, the history of the revolutionary period suggests the types of special
laws that are disfavored by the value of legislative generality. Second,
judicial recognition of this value should lead courts to modify doctrine
related to special legislation. Third, enforcing a value of legislative
generality would improve jurisprudence by making judicial doctrines
related to special legislation more coherent.
A. The Contours of the Value of Legislative Generality
The history of the revolutionary era strongly suggests that legislative
generality is a value of constitutional dimension. The most prevalent,
and most offensive, of the legislative abuses unleashed after
independence came in the form of special laws. After a decade of
abusive special legislation, members of the revolutionary generation
rejected the power of the legislature to enact special laws. They
affirmed their commitment to the value of legislative generality both by
articulating a theoretical defense of this value and by enshrining
protections against abusive special legislation in their state constitutions.
By the time they arrived in Philadelphia to frame the new national
government, they had in mind the object to put an end to laws that
singled out individuals or groups for special treatment, including special
benefit and special detriment legislation.
The revolutionary
generation’s commitment to legislative generality is evident in the early
legislative and judicial practice of the new republic. Congress enacted
few special laws after ratification and none of the types most criticized
during the confederation period. The early Court enforced the value of
legislative generality by criticizing, and ultimately invalidating, a number
of special laws.357 For these reasons, any court or scholar who considers
the history of the framing of the Constitution probative of its
interpretation should treat the value of legislative generality as an
independent constitutional principle and evaluate the constitutionality
of legislation in light of this principle.
Having evaluated the history of the framing period, the central tenet
of the value of legislative generality is easy to state: the value of
legislative generality disfavors legislation that singles out a person or

357. See supra Part V.
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small, identifiable group for special treatment to which the general
population is not subject. The core commitments of the value of
legislative generality prohibit the legislature from: granting special
benefits, like licenses and transfers of property; levying special harms,
like confiscation of property and deprivation of liberty; interfering with
both civil and criminal judicial processes for named claimants or
defendants; declaring the proper interpretation of a standing law in a
particular case; declaring void a previously enacted law; and transferring
property from one person to another.
In addition to these core commitments, the history of the
revolutionary generation suggests some broader principles that help
guide the interpretation of the value of legislative generality. The value
of legislative generality is less likely to disfavor special laws that
prefigure generally applicable laws, like a law incorporating a particular
corporation that also applies generally to future corporations. Similarly,
the value of legislative generality is less likely to disfavor special laws
that eliminate, rather than create, disparities between people, like a law
that ensures that an individual is treated the same as others similarly
situated. Nevertheless, even if extenuating circumstances require the
enactment of special legislation, the core commitments to the value of
legislative generality, stated above, should be respected.358
B. Enforcing the Value of Legislative Generality Will Require the Court
to Modify Doctrine Related to Special Legislation.
Modern Supreme Court jurisprudence rejects the argument that
“there is something wrong with particularized legislative action,”359
measuring special legislation instead against deferential doctrines like
equal protection, due process, and separation of powers, rather than
against an independent principle of legislative generality.360 As a result,
restrictions on special legislation are weak, and both Congress and state
legislatures freely enact special laws. Among the most common modern
special laws, legislatures enact statutes transferring public funds to
named natural persons361 or corporations,362 granting exemptions from

358. See supra Part V.
359. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 239 n.9.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 92–102.
361. E.g., Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558,
565 (2013); Priv. L. No, 108-5, 118 Stat. 4030 (2004); Priv. L. No. 107-2, 116 Stat. 3119 (2002);
Priv. L. No. 103-5, 108 Stat. 5064 (1994); Priv. L. No. 103-3, 108 Stat. 5062 (1994).

690

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:625

generally applicable statutes and regulations,363 singling out individuals
for special legal disabilities,364 confiscating particular pieces of
property,365 levying special detriments on particular corporations,366 and
abrogating specific contracts.367
The value of legislative generality as described above suggests that,
notwithstanding the Court’s modern jurisprudence, there is something
wrong with particularized legislative action.368 As a result, courts should
invalidate special laws that violate this principle. For example, courts
should invalidate laws like Terri’s Law, which applied only to “any
parent” of a particular person, granting a special exemption from
generally applicable jurisdictional rules without prefiguring generally
applicable laws. Similarly, courts should invalidate private immigration
laws, which violate the principle of legislative generality by relieving
named individuals from generally applicable laws governing
immigration and naturalization.369 Courts also should invalidate the
numerous special laws that Congress and state legislatures bury in
unrelated public laws; for example, Congress’s transfer of public wealth
to the widows of two deceased Senators by name370 should be struck
down as violative of the principle of legislative generality.
Some special laws do not implicate the core commitments of the
value of legislative generality; for example, a legislature might enact a

362. Rubin, supra note 18, at 398 n.22; see also Wakefield, supra note 50, at 853.
363. Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010);
Priv. L. No. 108-6, 118 Stat. 4032 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-4, 118 Stat. 4028 (2004); Priv. L. No.
108-3, 118 Stat. 4026 (2004); Priv. L. No. 108-1, 118 Stat. 4023 (2004); Priv. L. No. 107-5, 116
Stat. 3123 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-1, 115 Stat. 2471 (2001) (all granting exemptions from the
Immigration and Nationality Act and reducing the total number of Visas otherwise available);
see also Priv. L. No. 105-4, 111 Stat. 2699 (1997) (granting citizenship retroactively to permit
beneficiary to be eligible for benefits only available to citizens).
364. Elizabeth Morgan Act, Pub. L. No. 104-205, § 350, 110 Stat. 2951, 2979 (1996).
365. See Mt. Soledad Veterans Memorial Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-272, § 2,
120 Stat. 770, 770–72 (2006); Paulson v. City of San Diego, 475 F.3d 1047, 1048 (9th Cir.
2007); see also 16 U.S.C. § 79c(b)(1) (2012); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 395 (1922).
366. E.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13
(1983) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247–48 & n.20 (1978)).
367. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1977).
368. Cf. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995).
369. E.g., Priv. L. No. 112-1 (2012); Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525 (2010); Priv. L. No.
111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010).
370. Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558, 565
(2013); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6,
§ 1601, 127 Stat. 198, 426 (2013).
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special law that eliminates disparities between people or sets the stage
for future generally applicable laws, as did the first Congress. The value
of legislative generality would not necessarily counsel in favor of striking
down such a law. However, most special laws do no such thing; rather,
they single out named individuals for special treatment, either to apply
special detriments or grant special benefits. Invalidation of these laws is
consistent with the value of legislative generality as described by the
historical experiences of the revolutionary generation.
In order to accommodate the value of legislative generality, the
Supreme Court will have to modify, albeit modestly, its standing
doctrine. With some exceptions, federal courts will entertain a
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute only if the plaintiff alleges
“injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct”
that is “likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”371 A person who
suffers harm that is merely “generalized and attenuated” from the
claimed unlawful action does not qualify for Article III standing.372
Many of the special laws discussed above cause harm that can be
redressed consistent with these standing doctrine principles. For
example, the father whose court-ordered visitation rights were
eliminated by Congress in the Elizabeth Morgan Act suffered a
specified injury that can be traced to the Act and would be redressed by
its invalidation.373
A somewhat harder case is presented by laws that grant exemptions
from generally applicable laws, like special immigration status laws.
Recall that these laws confer preferential immigration status on named
individuals, but at the price of reducing the number of visas available to
individuals from the country of origin of the beneficiaries of the special
law.374 As a result, for every person who is granted special immigration
status, another person is, in a palpable way, harmed. However, the visa
applicant who was next in line for a visa, and was therefore harmed by
the special immigration law, would not know that she was next in line
for a visa and would, therefore, not know that she had been harmed by
the law. As a result, the person whose visa was denied as a direct

371. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 598 (2007) (plurality
opinion) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
372. Hein, 551 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion).
373. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
374. E.g., 124 Stat. at 4525; 124 Stat. at 4523.
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consequence of a special immigration law cannot trace her injury to that
law. In order to enforce a value of legislative generality meaningfully in
the case of special immigration laws, therefore, the Court would have to
expand the universe of individuals permitted to challenge these special
laws. But a modification of standing doctrine in the case of special
immigration laws could be accomplished without seriously
compromising the purpose of standing. In the case of a special
immigration law, standing could be expanded to include only current
visa applicants from the country of origin of the beneficiary of the law.
This modestly expanded definition of standing would permit meaningful
enforcement of the value of legislative generality while, at the same
time, limiting standing to individuals who have more than a generalized
and attenuated interest in the constitutionality of immigration
legislation.
The value of legislative generality is hardest to square with current
standing doctrine in the context of special financial benefit legislation.
For example, the recent special laws that granted gratuitous payments to
the widows to two deceased Senators benefitted these individuals at the
expense of the public fisc.375 In general, no one has standing to
challenge special financial benefit legislation because the Court has held
that the interest of a taxpayer in the allocation of public money is too
“generalized and attenuated” to qualify for Article III standing.376
However, under the Flast exception to this general rule, a taxpayer has
standing to challenge the unconstitutionality of a congressional transfer
of wealth if the taxpayer shows that “the challenged enactment exceeds
specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the
congressional taxing and spending power.”377 A fair reading of Flast
might permit a taxpayer to challenge a special financial benefit law on
the theory that Congress violates the taxing and spending power by
exercising that power in violation of the value of legislative generality.
However, even if Flast does not apply by its terms to a challenge based
on a violation of the principle of legislative generality, the Court could
use Flast as a model for another, limited exception to the taxpayer
standing rule for special financial benefit laws. A new, limited exception
to the taxpayer standing rules, modeled on Flast, would give meaning to
375. Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, § 145; Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013, § 1601.
376. Hein, 551 U.S. at 599 (plurality opinion).
377. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1968).
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the value of legislative generality but would not affect the overwhelming
majority of Congress’s allocation decisions, which are done through
general, as opposed to special, laws.
C. The Value of Legislative Generality Provides Coherent Treatment of
Special Legislation.
Although a complete evaluation of the consequences of enforcing a
value of legislative generality must wait until the completion of future
work, one normatively attractive feature is readily apparent even now.
The Court considers challenges to special legislation under a number of
constitutional doctrines and has formulated a number of different tests,
applied different standards, and deferred to the legislature in varying
degrees, depending on the constitutional doctrine invoked, the subject
matter of the legislation, and the status of the individual or group
singled out for special treatment. As a result, when courts invalidate
special laws, they do so in an incoherent, and sometimes unpredictable,
manner. Enforcement of a value of legislative generality will bring
coherence to current doctrine related to special legislation.
1. A Value of Legislative Generality Disfavors Both Special Benefit
and Special Detriment Legislation.
The Court’s current doctrine provides significantly greater
protections against laws that impose special detriments than those that
provide special benefits. For example, as noted above, the Court
subjects a gratuitous payment from the public fisc to a named individual
to virtually no scrutiny; by contrast, a law appropriating the same
amount from the same individual might raise concerns under the Equal
Protection, Ex Post Facto, or Takings Clauses.378 The incoherence
between judicial review of special benefit and special detriment
legislation would be corrected by enforcing a value of legislative
generality that takes into account the historical experiences of the
revolutionary generation. The legislative abuses of the revolutionary
period included not only special detriment statutes banishing
individuals, confiscating property, and rescinding property rights, but
also legislation granting monopoly rights, immunity from prosecution,
office holding privileges, and unequal legal protections.379 The value of

378. See supra text accompanying notes 103–05.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 191–242

694

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:625

legislative generality strongly suggests, therefore, that both special
benefit and special detriment laws are constitutionally suspect. Judicial
doctrine treating both special detriment and special benefit laws
similarly would therefore be more coherent than the Court’s current
doctrine.
2. A Value of Legislative Generality Disfavors Both Criminal and Civil
Special Legislation.
Current doctrine distinguishes between special legislation that
provides criminal penalties and special legislation that creates civil
liability. Because current jurisprudence protects against special laws
more strongly in the criminal than in the civil context, otherwise
identical laws are subjected to different levels of scrutiny depending on
whether the court characterizes them as a criminal or civil laws. As
noted above, the FERA Amendments to the FCA revived particular
dismissed cases.
Courts reviewing the constitutionality of these
amendments focus on whether the FCA is criminal or civil rather than
whether the FERA amendments provided special treatment for
particular cases. Because they do not take into account the special
nature of the amendments, some courts have struck down the
amendments as retroactive criminal laws while others have permitted
them as civil laws.380 A value of legislative generality would eliminate
this incoherence by disfavoring special legislation in both the criminal
and civil contexts, as is suggested by the historical experiences of the
revolutionary generation. The revolutionary generation enacted, and
ultimately came to repent of, both criminal and civil special statutes,
including statutes preventing Tories from practicing their professions,
statutes granting immunity from civil liability and criminal prosecution,
statutes granting or withdrawing special property rights, and bills of
attainder.381 This history strongly suggests that the constitutionality of
the FERA Amendments, and laws like it, should not turn on whether a
court characterizes the law as criminal or civil; rather, the essential issue
is whether the law can be said to violate the principle of legislative
generality.

380. See supra text accompanying notes 106–08.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 191–242.
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3. A Value of Legislative Generality Disfavors Both State and Federal
Special Legislation.
The Court’s current jurisprudence draws a distinction between state
laws and federal laws that single out individuals for special treatment.
As noted above, a state law breaching a public contract, effectively
singling out for detrimental treatment the party who contracted with the
government, is reviewed with greater scrutiny than an identical federal
breach of a public contract.382 A value of legislative generality would
eliminate this incoherence by treating breaches of public contracts the
same, no matter whether the law breaching the contract was state or
federal in origin. A value that treats federal and state breaches the same
way reflects the historical experiences of the revolutionary generation.
The special laws that impelled the revolutionary generation to reform
their legal systems included not only their direct experiences with
special laws enacted by their own state legislatures, but also the cultural
memory of special laws enacted by Parliament in Britain. Bills of
attainder not only proliferated during the revolutionary war, but also
were enacted for centuries by Parliament.383 American state grants of
property to well-connected citizens mirrored the hated monopoly rights
granted by Parliament in Britain.384 And the popular reaction to the
Cincinnati was understandable only in light of the special legal privileges
accorded by Parliament to the nobility in England.385 The fact that
special laws rejected by the revolutionary generation included laws both
originating in the states and, prior to that, in Parliament, suggests that a
value disfavoring special laws should be enforced irrespective of the
source of the law. As a result, a value of legislative generality should
operate to restrain both Congress and state legislatures.
In sum, the Court’s jurisprudence does not provide coherent
protections against special legislation; that is, protections against special
legislation vary depending on whether the law at issue provides benefits
or detriments, whether it is criminal or civil, and whether the law is a
state or federal statute. The Court is more deferential toward special
legislation on certain subject matters, like immigration, than it is on
others, like takings. The Court’s doctrine forces lower courts to make
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distinctions, as in the case of the FERA Amendments, that lead to
inconsistency between courts and unpredictability for legislatures. The
historical experiences of the revolutionary generation suggest that the
value of legislative generality transcends these distinctions; accordingly,
the constitutionality of special legislation should be measured against
the value of legislative generality irrespective of the characteristics
normally used to distinguish between different types of special laws. In
light of a value of legislative generality, a special law granting special
immigration status should be scrutinized like a special law stripping a
citizen of citizenship; a special law convicting a named party of a crime
should be treated the same as a special law granting a named party
immunity from prosecution; a special law granting public property to a
private party should be scrutinized along with a special law confiscating
private property. By eliminating these distinctions, enforcing an
independent principle of legislative generality will make the Court’s
doctrine related to special legislation more coherent.
VII.CONCLUSION
I expect that the thesis of this article comes as a surprise even to
readers steeped in constitutional law and history. The power of the
legislature to enact special legislation without meaningful or coherent
constitutional restraints has been taken for granted by the courts and
questioned only at the periphery by scholars. But I do not suggest
lightly that a value restraining special legislation should be revived as an
enforceable constitutional principle. Rather, I am compelled to this
result by evidence of the historical experiences of the period leading up
to the framing of the Constitution, the Constitution’s text, and its
philosophical underpinnings.
Because the full spectrum of issues implicated by reviving legislative
generality as an enforceable constitutional value cannot possibly be
addressed in the limited space of a single article, this piece is intended to
be an introduction to the value of legislative generality rather than the
last word on the subject. In future work, I will explore the textual and
philosophical justifications underlying the value of legislative generality;
this inquiry may well suggest refinements to this principle as well as
provide additional support for it. No matter how the value of legislative
generality develops, however, any judicial recognition of this value will
serve an important goal of the Constitution: to create a “safe space”
from democracy, a space in which individuals are insulated against a
thoughtless or corrupt legislature, the vicissitudes of public opinion, and
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the passions and prejudices of the majority.
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